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1.

INTRODUCTION

The world today is facing a tremendous health problem: there
simply are not enough kidneys to supply those who need them.
Kidneys for transplantation can be procured either through
cadaveric or living donation. Cadaveric donation involves a
person donating her kidneys upon her death. This type of
donation is complicated, however, because the deceased donor
must be brain dead. The narrow criteria for cadaveric kidney
donors ensure that there will never be enough kidneys that come
from deceased people. Therefore, cadaveric donation will never be
able to meet the demand for kidneys. Living donation, which
occurs when a person decides to donate while she is alive, could
supplement the kidney supply; however, because there is little
incentive, aside from altruism, to donate the organ unless the
donor is a relative or close friend, the number of living donors is
low.
This shortage has led to the emergence of a black market for
kidneys in which people from poor countries who need money
more than a second kidney are the main suppliers. In many cases,
middlemen broker the kidney sales, charging the purchasers a
large sum of money and giving only a small fraction of the profit to
the economically disadvantaged suppliers. Additionally, many
suppliers cannot afford nor have access to medical care for postsurgery examinations. Consequently, many suppliers are left
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worse off economically, physically, and mentally, than they were
before selling their kidney.
In response to the shortage and the black market for kidneys,
several potential proposals have been put forth: an open market, a
futures market, and a procurement system based on presumed
consent. While these proposals are meritorious and could increase
the kidney supply, they are not feasible because there are serious
ethical drawbacks to each proposal and none of the solutions
would individually procure enough kidneys to meet the demand.
Kidney procurement is hard to do. It is difficult finding an
ethically permissible solution that will increase the kidney supply,
and no matter what system the United States utilizes there will
always be a core of people who will never donate for their own
personal reasons. This paper, however, argues that there is a
solution that would be an effective and ethically permissible
system for increasing the kidney supply through cadaveric and
living donations in the United States: a three-prong combination
of presumptivity, a heightened education and awareness
campaign, and weak economic incentives.
Section Two of this Comment provides background on the
kidney shortage and why it exists. Section Three explains the laws
various countries have adopted to try to combat the sale of kidneys
from living donors. Section Four discusses the emergence of the
black market and the problems associated with it. Section Five
explores three potential policy responses to avoid the abuses
associated with the black market, evaluates and analyzes their
effectiveness and ethical implications, and determines that none of
the proposals, alone, are ethically permissible.
Section Six,
therefore, proposes another solution: a three-prong combination of
presumptivity, an aggressive education and awareness campaign,
and weak financial incentives.
2.

THE KIDNEY SHORTAGE

Today, many people suffer from kidney disease or failure. A
person suffering from kidney failure has three possible treatment
options: hemodialysis, peritoneal dialysis, or a kidney transplant.'
Hemodialysis uses an artificial kidney, a hemodialyzer, to remove
the waste and extra chemicals in the patient's blood through a
1 See Nat'l Kidney Found., A to Z Health Guide: Kidney Transplant (May 18,
2005),
http://www.kidney.org/atoz/atozltem.cfm?id=86
(explaining
the
different treatment options available to people with kidney problems).
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blood vessel; peritoneal dialysis cleans the patient's blood in her
body by dialystate that enters through a catheter in the patient's
stomach. 2 Dialysis performs the function of the kidneys; it
prevents the buildup of salt, water, and waste in the body by
removing the excess, balances other chemicals in the blood, and
Dialysis, however, can be
helps control blood pressure. 3
uncomfortable since needles are inserted into blood vessels or the
stomach, and there can be adverse effects such as nausea,
headaches, or cramps due to a drop in blood pressure. 4 Dialysis
treatment can also require a change in diet and can be time5
consuming.
Because dialysis can lead to uncomfortable side effects and
require a lot of treatment time, kidney transplants offer the best
chance for quality of life once the procedure is completed;
however, the actual process is not an easy one. The patient can
receive a kidney from either a cadaveric or living donor, which is
transplanted after the patient undergoes a nephrectomy, or
removal of her original kidney. 6 A transplant is expensive, about
$51,000 even after Medicare or Medicaid pays its share. 7 This
2 See Nat'l Kidney Found., A to Z Health Guide: Dialysis (June 3, 2004),
http://www.kidney.org/atoz/atozltem.cfm?id=39 (explaining hemodialysis and
peritoneal dialysis).
3 See id. (providing the purpose of dialysis).
4 Id.
5 Id.
Definition of Nephrectomy (Aug. 2, 2000),
6 See MedicineNet.com,
(defining
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=4527
nephrectomy).
7 See
eHow,
How
to Learn More About
Kidney
Transplants,
http://www.ehow.com/how_10141_leam-about-kidney.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2005) (providing the basic information about kidney transplants, including costs).
See also Aetna, Kidney Transplant, http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/
WSIHW000/9339/31200.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) (stating that hospital
costs are about $40,000 for a kidney transplant and can total more than $100,000
when doctors' bills, medications, and follow-up care are included); HEALTH CARE
FIN. ADMIN., MEDICARE COVERAGE OF KIDNEY DIALYSIS AND KIDNEY TRANSPLANT

SERVICES (2001), availableat http://www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/

esrdcoverage.pdf (explaining that the amount Medicare will contribute to the
various costs associated with a kidney transplant depends on whether a patient
has Medicare Part A and Part B coverage, or is just covered by Part A; Part A is
the hospital insurance which has no premiums, while Part B is medical insurance
that requires premiums, deductibles, and coinsurance); Nat'l Kidney and Urologic
Diseases Info. Clearinghouse, FinancialHelp for Treatment of Kidney Failure (Feb.
2005), http://kidney.niddk.nih.gov/kudiseases/pubs/financialhelp/#medicare
(informing that Medicaid will pay for some of the treatment costs if a patient falls
below a certain income level and, in some states, could pay the 20% Medicare
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figure does not include the cost of the drugs needed after the
transplant. Because the body's immune system protects the body
from foreign substances, such as bacteria, the patient's body may
reject the kidney because it recognizes the transplanted tissue as
"foreign."8 Therefore, immunosuppressant drugs are needed to
prevent rejection; hopefully, the body adjusts to the new kidney
and, eventually, the transplant will be a success.
While the entire process of kidney transplantation is arduous
and expensive, the most difficult part is obtaining a kidney. In the
United States, as of February 26, 2006, there were 65,541 people on
the waiting list for a kidney transplant. 9 In 2005, there was only a
combined total of 12,214 cadaveric and living kidney donors. 10 In
Europe, as of June 2003, there were about 40,000 people on the
waiting list for kidneys, and an estimated 15-20% would die before
a kidney became available." A report published by the Conference
of European Health Ministers stated that in 2003 the waiting list
time for a "legally acquired organ" was three years, and that by
2010 it was expected to jump to ten years because of the shortage. 12
Thousands of people die each year from kidney failure, and many
could have lived had there been a kidney match for them.
The list of potential donors is naturally limited because of the
criterion that the cadaveric donors must be brain dead. Typically,
donors are usually "less than fifty-five years old and free of
infection" whose "major organs other than the brain must be
functioning while they are temporarily sustained on the heart-lung
machine." 13 Therefore, many of the organ donors tend to be young
does not cover). How much a private insurance company will cover depends on
the individual policy. Some policies will pay for the entire cost of treatment while
others will pay the 20% Medicare does not cover. Id.
8 National Kidney Foundation, supra note 1.
9 See United Network for Organ Sharing, U.S. Transplantation Data,
http://www.unos.org/data/default.asp?displayType=usData (last checked Feb.
26, 2006) (listing the number of people on the waitlist for kidney and other
transplants throughout the United States).
10 See The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Donors
Recovered in the U.S. by Donor Type (Feb. 17, 2006), http://www.optn.org/ (follow
"Data" hyperlink; then "View Data Reports" hyperlink; click on "National Data";
select "Donor" as Category and "Kidney" as Organ; then follow "All Donors by
Donor Type" hyperlink).
11 See Europeans Nix Organ Black Market, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 13, 2003,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/13/health/main558664.
shtml (discussing the kidney shortage in Europe).
12 Id.
13

Andrew H. Barnett et al., Improving Organ Donation: Compensation versus
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adults who were in an accident that involved a serious head
trauma.1 4 Even more disheartening is that " [tlhe potential demand
for organs is much greater than present levels may indicate." 15 For
instance, the list does not include the elderly; people over the age
of eighty-five are not put on the list because physicians do not
think their bodies can handle a transplant and a donor kidney
should go to someone with a greater chance of survival.
Not only is there a lack of a plentiful supply of kidneys, but it is
16
also difficult to find a donor match among those kidneys. When
a kidney becomes available, the kidney is matched to a candidate
with the same blood group and tissue type. 17 Other factors include
how long a candidate has been on the waiting list and her medical
condition. 18 Transplant centers also try to match a kidney locally
Markets, in THE ETHIcS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS 208, 208 (Arthur L. Caplan &
Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998). In situations of a sudden trauma, for instance a car
accident, the body can be artificially maintained on a ventilator for less than an
hour in order to preserve the viability of the kidneys. See E-mail from Arthur
Matas, M.D., Transplant Surgeon, Univ. of Minn. (Feb. 16, 2006, 17:11:26 CST) (on
file with author). Typically, however, kidneys are removed from deceased donors
under controlled conditions such as an operating room, where everything is set
up in advance and then stored with preservation fluid on ice until implantation
into recipients. If the kidney is deprived of circulation and, therefore, oxygen for
an extended period of time, the kidneys are no longer viable. It is recommended
that no more than twenty minutes elapse between when the deceased goes into
cardiac arrest and when the kidneys are placed on ice, although longer periods of
thirty to forty minutes do occasionally occur. The longer the time lapse, the
greater likelihood the kidneys will not work well or at all. Once the kidneys are
on ice, they can be stored for up to forty-eight hours before being used; however,
most transplant centers aim to get the kidney transplanted within less than ten to
fourteen hours. Usually, kidneys are transplanted between twelve and twentyfour hours after removal. Again, the longer the kidneys stay on ice for more than
twenty-four to thirty hours, the worse the post-transplant graft outcomes. The
time frame for removal and transplant also depends on the quality of the donor
organ because older donor organs are more susceptible to injury while younger
See E-mail from Roy Bloom, M.D., Med. Dir.,
ones are more resistant.
Kidney/Pancreas Transplant Program, Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa. (Feb. 16, 2006,
18:04:58 EST) (on file with author).
14 See Andrew H. Barnett et al., supra note 13 (describing the type of patients
that tend to become organ donors).
15 Arthur L. Caplan, Ethical and Policy Issues in the Procurement of Cadaver
Organsfor Transplantation,in THE ETHIcS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13, at
143.
16 See e.g. Nat'l Kidney Found., Transplant Waiting List (May 17, 2004),
(providing answers to
http://www.kidney.org/atoz/atozltem.cfm?id=114
typical questions regarding the donor matching process and showing that there
are a lot of considerations that go into finding a match).
17 Id.

18 Id.
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or within its network and if there is no match, the transplant center
will look for a candidate regionally, then nationally.' 9 Thus, larger
pools of kidneys are needed to ensure more donor-recipient
matches.
In the United States, the most widely accepted method of organ
donation is cadaveric donation. The donor either personally
consents to donating her organs or her family, upon her death,
donates her organs.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
("UAGA"),2 created in 1968 and adopted by all states and the
District of Columbia, established this donation process based on
the idea that "a person's organs were of no value to him after his
death, and . . . were of enormous value to their potential
recipients," therefore, a person "would be moved by
(consequentialist) moral considerations to donate them." 21 It is
unlikely, however, that the express consent laws of the United
States are to blame for the kidney shortage. 22 Even under
alternative systems of presumed consent, where the deceased's
organs are harvested unless she or her next of kin registered an
objection before her death, procurement rates are low as evidenced
by the European countries that utilize such a system.23
An obvious reason for the kidney shortage in the United States
is that people are not motivated or provided with any incentive to
donate their kidneys. The lack of motivation "is even more acute
in countries where religious or cultural considerations inhibit
organ donation."24 People could also fear that if they are organ
19 Id.

20 See infra note 42 (discussing the UAGA and what the act establishes).
21 JAMES STACEY TAYLOR, STAKES & KIDNEYS: WHY MARKETS IN HUMAN BODY

PARTS ARE MORALLY IMPERATIVE 5 (2005), availableat http://www.ashgate.com/
subject-area/downloads/sample-chapters/Stakes andKidneysChl.pdf.
22 See Henry Hansmann, Markets for Human Organs, in A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR BIOETHcS 145, 145 (Cosimo Marco Mazzoni ed., 1998) (explaining that the U.S.
system of express consent for kidney donation is not to blame for the shortage
because European countries also have a shortage under their system of presumed
consent).
23 See id. ("In Europe ... most countries have adopted a rule of 'presumed
consent,' under which organs are assumed available for transplant unless an
objection is registered ... [y]et none of the European countries have notably better
donation rates than does the United States, apparently because even strictly
construed presumed consent laws function in practice like the American regime
under which explicit approval is required.").
24 D.J. Rothman et al., The Bellagio Task Force Report on Transplantation,Bodily
Integrity, and the International Traffic in Organs, 29 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS
2739, 2739 (1997), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/
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donors, then they might be less likely to receive life-saving
treatment because physicians would want to harvest their organs
so as to "save a greater number of lives." 25 The shortage problem
is further magnified because of two other factors. 26 First, just
because a person decides to donate her organs upon her death does
not mean the organs will be transplanted. Because a person must
only be brain dead while the rest of her organs are oxygenated,
there is a limited window of opportunity to harvest the kidneys.
Situations could easily arise where the willing donor cannot be
identified in time to harvest her organs; for instance, she could not
have her driver's license with her, indicating her donor status,
when she is brought into the hospital.27 And, even if the willing
donor,
donor does have identification indicating she is an organ 28
her "family could still object to the retrieval of [her] organs."
Second, there are considerable costs to both the donor's family
and the physician. Keeping a willing donor on life support in
order to keep the organs oxygenated can be economically
burdensome on the family, as well as psychologically taxing
because the willing donor is a loved one in a physical state where
she seems alive. 29 Physicians also feel psychologically burdened
00411345 (follow "Volume 29" hyperlink; then "Volume 29, Issue 6" hyperlink;
then follow hyperlink for pages 2739-2745). See also Section 5.1.6, infra (discussing
various religions' views on donating organs).
25 TAYLOR, supra note 21.
26 See also Caplan, supra note 15, at 144 (noting that there are a variety of
factors that contribute to the ineffectiveness of the current cadaveric donation
system in the United States including "lack of trust on the part of physicians and
hospital administrators in the legal authority of donor cards, the failure of the
public to sign and carry donor cards, the failure of hospital personnel to locate
donor cards, and most important, the failure of physicians and nurses to inquire
about the possibility of organ donation in the absence of written directive on the
part of the deceased").
27 See TAYLOR, supra note 21 (explaining a situation where a willing donor's
kidneys would not be harvested, thus, contributing to the kidney shortage).
28 Id.
29 Also, if a person is a potential donor and is "neurologically devastated,"
she is given a series of tests until her full brain death is established. This process
could take up to forty-eight hours after the patient's family is notified (although
there are exceptions to the full brain death criteria for donations from those
without a pulse). Sometimes, this process is too intense for a family to handle and
some who initially agree to donate their loved one's organs, eventually request
that the loved one be taken off of the machine, which renders donation
impossible. Other families, particularly those of young loved ones, insist on
holding the loved one as her heartbeat and respirations stop after the life support
is removed and "find that they cannot allow their child to be taken for
procurement surgery." Ann C. Klassen & David K. Klassen, Who are the Donors in
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because they are placed in a position where they must request
"organs from the relatives of a person who appears still to be
sentient" 30 and who are in a highly emotional state of mind. 31
Because of the stress and emotions the families are under when
they are asked to donate their deceased loved ones' organs, more
32
than fifty percent do not donate.
In addition to the kidney shortage, another problem in meeting
the demand for kidneys is that the limited number of available
organs might not get to the patients who "need them [the] most or
to whom they are best suited." 33 In the United States, for example,
it is common for organs to be transplanted to a patient within the
same hospital that extracted the organ.34 It is also customary that
the organs are transplanted to a patient in a hospital that is "served
by the same local regional transplant center, even if there is a more
suitable recipient (or a more able transplant team) located
elsewhere . . . because the hospital that extracts [the organ] ...
[has] little incentive to do otherwise." 35 Therefore, the kidneys
appear to be going to those in closest proximity to the organs and
not to those who need them the most.
For a variety of reasons, there is a shortage of kidneys in the
United States, which isn't meeting the demand, and the list of
people who need kidneys grows by the day. If receiving a kidney
is a matter of life or death, what is a patient to do?
Organ Donation? The Family's Perspective in Mandated Choice, in THE ETHICS OF
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13, at 156 (explaining why having a loved one on
life support and being confronted with whether to donate her organs, is
psychologically burdensome on families).
30 TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 6.
31 "Because most organ donors are young people who die unexpectedly, the
family is often devastated and in shock. Under these circumstances, clear
thinking may be impossible." Aaron Spital, Mandated Choice for Organ Donation:
Time to Give It a Try, in THE ETHIcs OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13, at 148.
For this reason, families may feel a lot of stress if they are approached by a
physician asking them for the organs of their recently deceased. It is also stressful
for the medical personnel involved because they do not want to add to the
families' stress.
32 See id. (stating that more than 50% of families refuse to donate their
deceased loved ones' organs and reasoning that this rate is because of the
emotional state the families are in and stress they are under).
33 Hansmann, supra note 22.
34 See id. at 145-46 (explaining how the hospitals are involved in the organ
transplantation process and that they work together with local regional transplant
centers, which does not always benefit someone who needs a kidney in another
location).
35 Id.
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LIVING KIDNEY DONATION LAWS

Because of the shortage of cadaveric organ donation, those who
need a kidney often seek a living donor, usually either a family
member or friend with the same blood type. Since having two
kidneys is not essential in that a person could still lead a good life
with only one kidney, it would seem that living donors would
provide kidneys. Living donors, however, are not always easy to
find because there is little incentive to offer for their kidneys, other
than the satisfaction that comes with saving or improving the life
of a family member or friend.
As a result of a higher demand for kidneys than the supply
from cadaveric or living kidney donors provides, patients needing
a kidney may turn to desperate measures such as buying a kidney
from a living person. Paying for a kidney, however, raises a host
of legal and ethical concerns and is frowned upon by the
international community. Recognizing that the sale of kidneys
occurs, several international organizations have issued position
statements concerning the practice. In 2004, the World Health
Assembly, at the urging of the World Health Organization,
advocated that member states "take measures to protect the
poorest and vulnerable groups from 'transplant tourism' and the
sale of tissues and organs, including attention to the wider problem
36
of international trafficking in human tissues and organs."
In 2000 the World Health Association noted that "[p]ayment
for organs and tissues for donation and transplantation should be
prohibited" because "[a] financial incentive compromises the
voluntariness of the choice and the altruistic basis for organ and
37
tissue donation" and violates "the principles of justice."
Consistent with these views, the United States and other
countries have banned the sale of organs from living donors, with
the exception of Iran and Pakistan, where the sale of kidneys is

36 World Health Assembly, Human Organ and Transplantation, 57th Sess.,
WHA 57.18 at 2 (May 22, 2004), http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf-files/
WHA57/A57_R18-en.pdf.
37 World Med. Ass'n, World Medical Association Statement on Human Organd &
Tissue Donation and Transplantation (Oct. 2000), http://www.wma.net/e/
policy/wma.htm. Additionally, the Bellagio Task Force on Transplantation,
Bodily Integrity, and the International Traffic in Organs was established to
examine the social, political, ethical, and medical ramifications of the kidney
shortage and kidneys for sale. See Rothmann, supra note 24 (stating the purpose of
the Bellagio Task Force and its goals).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

214

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 27:1

legal and regulated. 38
In the United States, courts have recognized a limited property
right in body parts. 39 Blood, semen, and other self-replicating body
fluids can be sold.40 It is, however, illegal to sell your body parts
for transplantation. 41 Congress, in 1968, adopted the UAGA, which
prescribed guidelines that limited the decision to donate organs
upon the death of an individual to the deceased or her next of
kin.42 The revised version of the law passed in 1987 explicitly
banned the sale of organs, imposed penalties, and specified that a
43
deceased's wishes could not be overridden by her next of kin.
A few years before Congress revised the UAGA, it also passed
an act complementary to the UAGA, the National Organ

38 See Sheera Frenkel, Organ-trafficking Laws in Key Countries, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR (June 9, 2004), availableat http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/

0609/pl2s02-wogi.html (listing various countries and the status of their organ sale
laws). On the other end of the spectrum, Iran does allow kidney sales, and the
transactions are controlled by two nongovernmental organizations; however, the
organizations do have government endorsement.
39 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 479-523 (Cal. 1990)
(holding that the plaintiff did not state a conversion claim by alleging that the
defendants used his cells for medical research without his consent because the
plaintiff did not retain an ownership interest in his cells after they left his body;
however, the plaintiff did state a claim for breach of a physician's duty to disclose
and get the plaintiff's informed consent).
40 See Stephen A. Mortinger, Comment, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. Regents of the
University of California and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 499,
504-06 (1990) (discussing the holding in Moore v. Regents of the University of
California and other cases used to determine what aspects of the body can be put
up for sale).
41 See id. at 506-08 (noting federal law banning the sale of organs discussed
infra note 44); see also Arthur Caplan, Organs.corn: New Commercially Brokered
Organ Transfers Raise Questions, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 8 (2004) (exploring the
online organ trade based on the story of Robert Smith, who was jailed for online
organ sales). Although federal statute bans the sale of organ, it does allow a
commercial broker to charge a price for brokering a donation. A transplant
surgery that occurred on October 20, 2004 in Colorado was the first one that was
arranged through a commercial company serving as a middleman. Robert Smitty
donated a kidney to Robert Hickey. Although Hickey did not pay Smitty, he did
pay a website, MatchingDonors.com, a monthly fee of $295 to advertise his need
for a kidney. Unfortunately, Smitty was arrested on failure to pay child support
although his arrest raised suspicion that he actually sold his kidney to Hickey. Id.
42 Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Validity and Application of Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act, 6 A.L.R. 6th 365 (2005). The original UAGA did not explicitly
address the sale of organs although the ban on the practice was implied.
43 See Laurel R. Siegel, Comment, Re-engineering the Laws of Organ
Transplantation, 49 EMORY L.J. 917, 932-33 (2000) (providing background
information about the UAGA and its revisions).
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Transplant Act ("NOTA"). 44 This Act states: "It shall be unlawful
for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer
any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce." 45 A
"body part" is defined as, "[T]he human (including fetal) kidney,
liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and
skin or any subpart thereof and any other human organ (or any
subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus) specified by
46
the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation."
The United States is not the only country that has adopted laws
banning the sale of organs such as kidneys. In 2004, the Council of
Europe, of which there are forty-six member states47 including
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom, recommended to member states
44

National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507 (1984) (codified at 42

U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.) [hereinafter National Organ Transplant Act].
45 The National Organ Transplant Act states as follows:

Prohibition of organ purchases:
(a) Prohibition: It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire,
receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects
interstate commerce.
(b) Penalties: Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall
be fined not more than $ 50,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
(c) Definitions: For purposes of subsection (a): (1) The term "human
organ" means the human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung,
pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart
thereof and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including
that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services by regulation. (2) The term "valuable consideration"
does not include the reasonable payments associated with the removal,
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control,
and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost
wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with the
donation of the organ. (3) The term "interstate commerce" has the
meaning prescribed for it by section 201(b) of the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act.
Id. at § 274(e) (2005).
46 Id.
47 See Europa, European Union Member States, http://europa.eu.int/abc/
governments/ index en.htm (last checked Feb. 23, 2006) (listing the member
states).
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that organ and tissue trafficking be prohibited. 48 The United
Kingdom passed the Human Organ Transplants Act of 1989, which
prohibits the commercial sale of organs that are to be used for
transplantation. 49 Belgium requires that the removal of any organ
from a cadaveric or living donor be done in collaboration with an
approved transplantation center in the country.5 0 Germany, Japan,
Switzerland, and France have clear laws against the sale of
organs.51 The Israeli Ministry of Health allows the removal of
organs from cadavers if the family permits it. If an individual
decides to be a living donor, she must get the permission of the
Ministry only after a hospital committee and social worker meet
with her.

52

Not all attempts to criminalize the sale of kidneys are
successful, which creates certain hot spots for kidney black
India tried to outlaw sales in 1994 with its
markets.5 3
48 See Council of Europe, Recommendation of the Comm. Of Ministers, 884th
Sess., Rec(2004)7 (2004), available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/SocialCohesion/
Health/Recommendations/
(follow "2004-2000" hyperlink; then follow
"Recommendation Rec(2004)7" hyperlink) (recommending that member states
should require the prohibition of organ and tissue trafficking).
49 Human Organ Transplants Act, 1989, c.31 (U.K.).
See Sheila McLean,
Reviewing UK Transplant Legislation, in ETHICAL EYE: TRANSPLANTS 150, 149-160
(Peter Morris ed., 2003) (explaining the developments in UK transplant legislation
over the years).
50 See WHO, InternationalDigest of Health Legislation, http://www3.who.int/
idhl-rils/frame.cfm?language=english (follow "By Country" hyperlink; then
select "Belgium;" then follow "Procedures" hyperlink) (discussing Belgium's
transplantation laws).
51 See generally id. (summarizing the transplantation laws of Germany, Japan,
Switzerland, France, and others).
52 Michael M. Friedlaender, The Right to Sell or Buy a Kidney: Are We Failing
Our Patients?, 359 LANCET 971, 971 (2002) (explaining the Israeli laws governing
kidney procurement and transfers). Israel has also banned the sale of kidneys
along with Brazil and South Africa. See, e.g. Frenkel, supra note 38 (summarizing
the ban on the sale of organs in various countries).
53 Other countries that have ineffective laws banning the sale of organs
include Brazil and South Africa. See Frenkel, supra note 38 (discussing the laws in
Brazil and South Africa). For example, in 2003, a Brazilian living donor sold his
kidney to a Brooklyn, NY woman through Israeli middlemen. Both the donor and
the receiver flew to South Africa where the operation took place. The donor was
paid $6,000, which was used to pay off debts, while the receiver was paid $65,000.
The donor was only monitored for about three days and put up in a safe house
whereas the receiver was lodged in a beach house and kept under intense medical
watch. The middlemen have since been arrested and jailed on organ trafficking
charges. See Larry Rohter, Tracking the Sale of a Kidney on a Path of Poverty and
Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at Al, A8; Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Black Market
Organs: Inside the Trans-Atlantic Transplant Tourism Trade, Lip MAGAZINE, June 3,
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Transplantation of Human Organs Act, but allowed for "unrelated
kidney sales." 54 The Philippines enacted an administrative order,
which explicitly stated that the "sale and purchase of kidney
organs by kidney vendors is prohibited" and that any medical
professional or facility that permitted the trade would be
penalized. 55 Despite the law, selling kidneys is still commonplace
and sometimes even the doctor is involved in brokering the
transaction. 56 And, although it is illegal in China to sell or
purchase organs, the Chinese government passed a law in 1984
that allows organs to be procured if they come from the bodies of
57
executed prisoners whose families do not claim them right away.
Cadaveric and living kidney donations do not meet the
demand for kidneys, which has led those in desperate need for
kidneys to resort to other methods of obtaining the organs. The
combination of the United States' laws and other countries' laws
banning the sale of kidneys has helped fuel the black market for
the organs.
4.

THE BLACK MARKET

Despite the fact that it is prohibited by law in most countries to
buy or sell a kidney, a black market for kidneys has emerged
because of the kidney shortage. "In general the flow of organs...
follows the modem routes of capital from south to north, from
2005, http://www.lipmagazine.org/articles/featscheperhughesp.htm.
4 See The Transplantation of Human Organs Bill, 1994, No. 42, Acts of
Parliament, 1994 (Ind.) availableat http://indiacode.nic.in/fullactl.asp?tfnm
=199442 (providing that commercial sales of organs are offences that are
punishable in India). See also Frenkel, supra note 38 (summarizing the loophole
created by India's law).
55 National Policy on Kidney Transplantation from Living Non Related
Donors, Administrative Order No. 124 s. 2002, sect. 4 (issued by the Philippines
Office of the Secretary, Department of Health).
56 See Francis Aguilar and Lalaine Siruno, A Community Without Kidney: A
Tragedy? Analysis of the Moral and Ethical Aspects of Kidney Organ Donation, available
at
http://web.kssp.upd.edu.ph/talastasan/papers/aguilar-siruno_paper.pdf
(arguing that physicians regularly conduct transplants using organs that had been
bought despite the country's law).
57 See Case Study: Illegal Human Organ Trade From Executed Prisoners in China
(Jan. 2001), at http://www.american.edu/TED/prisonorgans.htm (citing China's
1984 policy, Rules Concerning the Utilization of Corpses or Organs from the
Corpses of Executed Prisoners, about procuring organs from its executed
prisoners). See also Barbara Basler, Kidney Transplantsin China Raise Concern About
Source, N.Y. TIMEs, June 3, 1991, at Al, A10 (raising speculation that executed
prisoners are the supply source of kidneys in China).
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third to first world, from poor to rich, from black and brown to
white and from female to male bodies."58 The kidneys come from
people who live in the poorer countries or areas, such as India,
South America, and Eastern Europe, and go to people who need
them in the richer countries, such as those in the United States or
Western Europe.5 9 Purchasers and suppliers are typically brought
together through a middleman and the transplant occurs at
designated centers in countries where there is little to no
regulation. The black market for kidneys is troublesome because it
exploits the poor and is unregulated, which negatively effects the
participants mentally, physically, and financially.
4.1. Purchasersof Kidneys
The motivating factors for purchasers of illegal kidneys appear
to be the shortage and quality of available organs. In the United
States, the average waiting time for a kidney transplant at an
institution such as the University of Pennsylvania transplant center
is about two and a half to three years. 60 The waiting list in Europe
for a legal transplant averages six years. 61 Thus, faced with a long
wait on the recipient list as a patient's health deteriorates, and
uncertainty as to whether a matching kidney will become
available, a patient desperate for a kidney resorts to purchasing the
organ on the black market despite the high costs, monetarily and
62
physically, for the transaction.
58 Organs for Sale:
China's Growing Trade and Ultimate Violation of
Prisoner's Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On International Operations and
Human Rights of the Comm. On International Relations, 107th Cong. 25 (2001)
(statement of Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Project Director, Organs Watch)
[hereinafter Organs for Sale].
59 See Catherine Berthillier, The Trade in Organs in Europe, in ETHICAL EYE:
TRANSPLANTS 161 (Peter Morris ed., 2003) (commenting on the reasons behind the
growth in medical tourism).
60 See Robert
Grossman, Waiting Time (March 2004), available at
http://www.pennhealth.com/transplant/kidney/waiting.htnl
(noting
the
average wait time at the Penn Transplant Center); see also Susan Smith, Organ
Allocation
at
the
Crossroads
(Apr.
26,
2002),
available
at
http://www.chfpatients.com/tx/txrules.htm (claiming that the average waiting
time for a kidney is almost three years, and if the waiting list continues to grow at
twenty percent annually while the number of donors remains below 10,000, the
average wait will increase to ten years by 2010).
61 Berthillier, supra note 59. This number will likely increase, given that the
number of people requiring dialysis treatment increases every year; in France, for
instance, the number has increased at a rate of five percent. Id.
62 See, e.g. Rohter, supra note 53 (sharing the story of a poor kidney donor).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss1/5

2006]

AN APPROACH TO THE KIDNEY SHORTAGE

219

Even were there not a shortage of cadaveric donors, patients
who can afford to buy a kidney on the black market might still
choose to purchase a kidney illegally from a living donor because
they like the idea that a live kidney might be in better condition
than one that comes from a cadaver. Kidneys that come from
cadavers often raise questions. Where did the cadaver come from?
What is the state of the kidney based the deceased's lifestyle
choices (such as drinking)? What is the quality of the kidney based
on the age of the deceased?
Nancy Scheper-Hughes, an
anthropologist at the University of California-Berkley, conducted
an interview in 2000 with a former lawyer who opted to have an
illegal transplant. 63 For the lawyer, the most important factor in
choosing to obtain a kidney illegally appeared to be his preference
to buy a kidney from a young adult who needed money. 64 He was
able to thus learn the health and personal history of his donor,
65
while providing the donor with economic aid.
The black market offers kidney purchasers the opportunity to
circumvent the waiting list and allows the purchasers to identify
the kidney's source. Thus, in order to eliminate the black market,
there is a need for both cadaveric and living donors, to address not
only the shortage, but also recipient preferences to know whether
the kidney comes from a healthy donor.
4.2. Suppliers of Kidneys
The black market could not thrive without willing sellers,
whose crucial motivating factor is money. This motivation is
evidenced by the fact that the majority of kidney donors come from
poorer countries such as India and Brazil. 66 An entirely new
supply source emerged with the fall of the Soviet Union. White
western Europeans used to travel great distances to the Far East,
South America, or even South Africa to find a potential seller, but
the fall of the Soviet Union created new supply sources on the
same continent. 67 Because purchasers are concerned with the
63 See Berthillier, supra note 59, at 162 (describing the study Nancy ScheperHughes conducted about illegal transplants).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See generally id. at 161-63 (describing the new European network for organs
in addition to India and South America); see also Rohter, supra note 53 (detailing
the path a kidney takes from a poor donor to a rich recipient).
67 See Berthillier, supra note 59, at 163 (explaining the emergence of a new
European network for illegal kidneys after the fall of the former Soviet Union and
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quality of these kidneys, many European purchasers view these
new supply sources as "white, sturdy, in relatively good health
and have not had to endure the famine and endemic diseases of
certain countries in the Third World." 68 Poor Eastern European
suppliers who need money, therefore, transact with buyers who
prefer kidneys to come from countries where there have been more
69
sanitary health conditions.
It is easy for an indigent person to rationalize selling a kidney.
A body can function with one kidney; therefore, if someone needs
money, why not sell a kidney? The black market is troubling
because it provides a marketplace for indigent suppliers to sell
their kidneys and creates a situation where the poor are exploited.
In 2001, a group of medical researchers conducted a study in
They sought to
Chennai (formerly called Madras), India. 70
quantify the "economic and health consequences of selling a
kidney." 71 The study participants overwhelmingly reported that
the reason they sold their kidney was to help pay off debts. 72 The
money the participants received for their kidney went to their
debts or the purchase of food and clothing.73
Financially, however, the sellers do not receive the full amount
of money paid by the buyers. Typically, sellers in Eastern
European countries receive $2,500 to $3,000 U.S. dollars for their
kidneys; however, the buyer is charged up to ten times that
how because of price and convenience, buyers want to undergo the transplant
operation close to home, explaining why Northern Americans tend to buy
kidneys in Latin America and Europeans use the "European network"). For
example, CBS broadcasting produced an episode of "48 Hours," which explored a
kidney transplant where the buyer was a wealthy American who bought a kidney
from a Peruvian woman for the price of $18,000. See also 48 Hours: Your Money or
Your Life: The Kidney Trade (CBS television broadcast July 31, 2002),2 available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/02/11/48hours/main32896 .shtld
(documenting an investigation conducted by "48 Hours" of an illegal kidney
transplantation).
68 Berthillier, supra note 59.
69 See generally id. (describing the attitude of kidney purchasers).
70 See generally Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health Consequences of
Selling a Kidney in India, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1589 (2002) (reporting the results of
a cross-sectional survey of people who sold their kidneys in India and drawing
conclusions from the results).
71 Id.
72 See id. (documenting the reasons why the study's participants sold their
kidneys).
73 See id. at 1591 (noting how the study's participants recalled spending the
money they received from selling their kidneys).
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74
amount, with the difference going to the middleman.
Participants in the India study were promised, on average, $1,410,
but actually received, on average, $1,070. 75 The middleman
promised, on average, about one-third more than what was
76
actually paid.
Unfortunately, for those donors whose sole motivating factor is
economic gain, the end result is not always what they imagined. In
most cases, the donors are actually worse off than they were before
selling their kidney. 77 The India study participants noted that their
economic status actually declined after selling their kidney. 78 At
the time of the nephrectomy, the average family income was $660,
79
and after the nephrectomy, at the time of the survey, it was $420.
Additionally, "the percentage of participants below the poverty
line increased from 54% to 71%."s0
Further, suppliers do not usually anticipate the psychological
repercussions that selling a kidney may have on them. "Organs
Watch" is an organization that studies the social and economic
81
effects of organ transplantation with a focus on the sale of organs.
One aspect of the organization's purpose is to monitor the mental
and physical effects of selling a kidney. According to ScheperHughes, with the exception of a few villages in India, sellers
throughout the world regretted selling their kidneys. 82 One of the
reasons given for sellers' regret was "they had not imagined the

74 See Cathy Johnson, Eastern Europeans Selling Kidneys for Cash (Aug. 7, 2003),
availableat http://abc.net.au/science/news/stories/s917832.htm.
75 See Goyal, supra note 70, at 1591 (providing the average amount the study
participants were promised, ranging from $450-$6,280, for selling their kidney
versus the average amount they actually received, ranging from $450-$2,660).
76 See id. (citing the middleman as the one who promised the sellers more
than they actually received).
77 See, e.g., id. (using the study participants' responses as evidence that the
donors are not financially better off after the sale of their kidneys).
78 Id.
79 See id. (detailing the change in economic status of the study participants
based on income level).
8o Id.
81 "Organs Watch" is a project that brings together anthropologists, human
rights activities, physicians, and social medicine specialists to study organ
transplantation, procurement, the illegal sale of organs, and track any
developments relating to the area. It was started by Nancy Scheper-Hughes and
Lawrence Cohen. See generally Organs Watch, http://sunsite3.berkeley.edu/
biotech/organswatch/pages/about.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
82 See Organs for Sale, supra note 58, at 41; see also Berthillier, supra note 59, at
166 (revealing that most sellers regret selling their kidneys).
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ordeal of the operation, the length of convalescence and the shame
they felt." 83 A donor from Lima, Peru told news investigators that
she felt, "forgotten." 84 The Indian sellers, in the end, realized that
the problem that prompted them to sell their kidneys was not
solved by the sale and concluded that they would be unlikely to
85
recommend for others to sell their kidney.
Physically, there are still questions as to whether there are
long-term health consequences to kidney removal. While there has
been limited scientific study in this area, the participants in the
India study did note some physical effects. 86 Only thirteen percent
of the participants noted no decline in health while eighty-six
percent reported some level of decline. 87 Additionally, "of all
participants, 50% complained of persistent pain at the
88
nephrectomy site and 33% complained of long-term back pain."
Although the study's participants may have overestimated their
state of health prior to the nephrectomy, 89 they still experienced
some level of notable pain after their kidney was removed. It is
also particularly troubling that sellers cannot afford a doctor. 90
Therefore, if health problems associated with kidney removal
develop, the sellers would not know because of their lack of access
to doctors. 91

Lastly, many of the sellers from indigent countries are women

Berthillier, supra note 59, at 166.
48 Hours, supra note 67; But see Rohter, supra note 53 (disclosing that the
Brazilian donor did receive a note from the woman who purchased his kidney
thanking him).
85 See Goyal et al., supra note 70, at 1591 (summarizing that seventy-nine
percent of the 264 participants in the study who were asked whether they would
recommend selling a kidney would not recommend it).
86 For a discussion about some of the adverse effects the Indians who sold
their kidneys experienced, see id. But see Berthillier, supra note 59, at 166 (noting
that no scientific study has looked at whether someone from a "disadvantaged
living environment" who sells a kidney has the same life expectancy as someone
in the same community who does not).
87 See Goyal et al., supra note 70 (reporting that many of the study's
participants experienced a decline in health after selling their kidney).
88 Id.
89 See id. at 1592 (considering the possible limitation that the decline in health
results could be from the participants overestimating their health status prior to
the nephrectomy).
90 Berthillier, supra note 59, at 166.
91 See id. at 165 (describing how the kidney sellers become an "invisible
population" and the lack of medical care they receive).
83
84
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who may be forced to sell their kidney against their will. 92 In the
India study, of the 305 participants, seventy-one percent were
women.93 Of those women, sixty percent were street vendors or
laborers, 94 and of the 221 married participants, 159 were female. 95
When the women were asked why they sold their kidneys rather
than their husbands: thirty percent said their husbands were the
breadwinners, twenty-eight percent said their husbands were ill,
96
and two participants said their husbands forced them to sell.
While only two women said their husbands forced them to sell, the
researchers noted that other women participants "may have been
reluctant to mention being forced to donate" because other family
97
members were around when the interviews were conducted.
These survey numbers suggest that not only are suppliers being
taken advantage of based on financial status, but also sex. This is
exacerbated when suppliers live in patriarchal societies such as
98
India.
The main suppliers in the black market are indigent people
desperate for money. Because the market is unregulated, these
people are typically exploited and left no better, or even worse-off,
mentally, physically, and economically, than they were before
selling their kidney. In order to eliminate this black market, more
kidneys must be made available. An effective solution must
ethically increase the kidney supply in order to decrease the need
to buy kidneys illegally from people in poorer countries.
4.3. The Middleman
The black market is mainly controlled by a middleman, the
person who brings the buyer and seller together. In the India
study, seventy percent of the participants sold their kidneys
See Goyal et al., supra note 70, at 1590 (stating how many of the study
participants were women).
92

93

Id.

94 See id. (describing the types of jobs that women who participated in the
study held).
95 See id. at 1591 (stating how many of the participants were married women).
96 See id. (providing data on why married women sold their kidneys).
97 Id. at 1592.
98 Vineet Chander, "It's (Still) A Boy.
Making the Pre-Natal Diagnostic
Techniques Act an Effective Weapon in India's Struggle to Stamp Out Female Feticide, 36
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 453, 455 (2004) ("India has traditionally been a
patriarchal society, a concept embedded in many of its historical, cultural
practices.").
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through a middleman. 99 Rarely do the buyer and seller come in
contact; rather, a small group of individuals known as the "organ
mafia" facilitate the transactions. 100 The "organ mafia" uses people
to find patients and donors, linking people on one continent to
another. 01 The "brokers," those who find the patients, are
contacted by patients via Internet or classified ads. 102 In Eastern
Europe, organized crime plays the role of the middleman that
03
connects buyers to sellers.
Sometimes, a doctor will advertise directly and serve as the
middleman. Dr. Bolivar Escobedo, a Peruvian doctor, solicits
kidney transactions through his own website and even took out an
ad in USA Today. 0 4 Financially, the middlemen are the ones who
benefit the most. In one transaction brokered by two Israeli
middlemen, the buyer paid $65,000 while the seller only received
$6,000.105 Although some of the money the buyer spent covered
her lodging and medical care, the middlemen pocketed a
06
substantial amount of money.'
Additionally, although laws in the United States prohibit the
buying, selling, and transferring of kidneys, there appears to be a
lack of enforcement. As of July 31, 2002, no one in the United
States had been prosecuted for buying or selling a kidney. 107 While
99 See Goyal et al., supra note 70, at 1590 (showing participant characteristics).
100 See Berthillier, supra note 59, at 163-164 (explaining the role of the "organ
mafia").
101 See, e.g., Rohter, supra note 53 (detailing how a Brooklyn, New York
woman bought a kidney from a Brazilian man through Israeli middlemen).
102 See Berthillier, supra note 59, at 164 (explaining how buyers get in touch
with the kidney brokers). A middleman can also be a commercial website. An
individual in need of a kidney can pay a monthly fee to the website to post an
advertisement, which a potential donor can answer. Soliciting donors through the
Internet is problematic, because of the potential for deception and the practice is
unregulated. Additionally, there are no protocols that govern the interaction
between the donor and recipient such as the amount of contact the parties should
have, the role a doctor should play, what happens if one party changes its mind at
the last minute, or who bears the financial burden if the donor dies or is injured.
103 See Goyal et al., supra note 70 (discussing the role of the mafia in the illegal
kidney trade). See also Organs for Sale, supra note 58 (reporting that a Japanese
gang, known as a yakuza, used connections and operated through a medical
center in Boston).
104 See 48 Hours, supra note 67 (noting how a Peruvian doctor solicits business
in the illegal kidney trade).
105 See Rohter, supra note 53 (documenting the transaction between a
Brooklyn, NY woman and a Brazilian seller).
106 Id.
107 See 48 Hours, supra note 67 (commenting how no one had been prosecuted
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hospitals and physicians are prohibited from transferring an illegal
organ, they are not required under NOTA to disclose whether a
patient had an illegal transplantation. 108 Therefore, many hospitals
in the United States invoke a "don't ask, don't tell" policy when
they see a patient who has come back from an illegal operation in
another country. 10 9 Two possible reasons for physician silence are
that doctors may sympathize with patients because of the kidney
shortage, and that it would be almost impossible to track down the
seller. 1 0 Additionally, doctors may realize that the patients who
are paying for their kidneys would probably rather pay the
monetary penalty, or even serve jail time, than die.
Doctors are the ones who see the patients, and likely the only
people (besides the patients' families) who would be privy to
knowledge of an illegal transplantation. Therefore, if the black
market is to be eradicated, this country also needs to address how
to regulate illegal kidney purchases. Without disclosure of patients
who have obtained kidneys illegally or effective sanctions as a
deterrent, a continued shortage of kidneys will ensure the
continued existence of the black market.
5.

PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE THE BLACK MARKET

The United States and the international community have
acknowledged the need to take proactive steps to eliminate the
kidney black market. In Europe, during the Conference of
European Health Ministers, the participant countries recognized
that medical treatment is a basic human right and "called for steps
to ease inequalities in access to health care both within and
between different countries in Europe.""' At best, however, these
for the sale of kidneys at the time of the television broadcast).
108 See National Organ Transplant Act, supra note 44, (a) (prohibiting any
person from knowingly acquiring, receiving, or transferring any human organ for
valuable consideration for transplant purposes if the transplant affects interstate
commerce). For purposes of this Act, interstate commerce is defined broadly by
21 U.S.C. § 321(b) to include foreign commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2000)
(defining interstate commerce as any "commerce between any State or Territory
and any place outside thereof"). See also United States v. Themy-Kotronakis, 140
F.3d 858, 863 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding that the Food and Drug Administration
definition of interstate commerce includes foreign commerce).
109 See e.g. 48 Hours, supra note 67 (expressing the reaction of American
hospital workers to patients who have undergone an illegal kidney transplant).
110 See id. (providing explanations for why doctors do not reveal patients who
obtained illegal kidney transplants to authorities).
111 Supra note 11.
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steps have merely heightened awareness of the legal consequences.
Because the penalties are rarely imposed, the laws are not an
effective deterrent to trading kidneys on the black market. For
example, in 1997, Brazil criminalized organ sales, but the trade
continues to exist. 112
Because laws against kidney sales have proved ineffective,
scholars have advanced other proposals to eliminate the black
market on kidneys. The potential proposals each have their
advantages and disadvantages. In evaluating these suggestions,
attention must be given to the ethical implications of each
proposal. How is the autonomy of the donor affected? What, if
any, third-party influences may arise? Is government involvement
necessary and, if so, how much involvement should it have?
Addressing these ethical and legal concerns, among others, is
important if we are to protect the interests of the parties involved.
Upon close examination of the leading proposals, each raises
ethical concerns that outweigh any potential benefits the current
proposals offer. None of the proposals, alone, would effectively
and ethically increase the kidney supply. The proposals that have
drawn the most attention are: an open market, a futures market,
and presumed consent for cadaveric organ donation.
5.1. Open Market
An open market raises ethical concerns centering around the
exploitation of the poor, kidney pricing and quality, notions of
altruism, third-party influences, physician participation, and
cultural and religious considerations. The open market proposal
places a price tag on the kidney and allows people to buy and sell
the organ freely. Since kidneys are already sold on the black
market, an open market seems to be a logical extension. There is a
supply and demand for the organs, so the transactions should be
legalized. The free market for kidneys would determine the price,
"so that the quantity demanded is approximately equal to the
quantity supplied." 113 This would help eliminate the kidney
shortage.
112 See Frenkel, supra note 38 (discussing Brazil's prohibition on organ sales);
see also Rohter, supra note 53.
113 Barnett et al., supra note 13, at 211. (showing the greater the need for the
kidney, the higher the price). This is because of scarcity. The higher price would
then incentivize people to supply kidneys. See id. (explaining the open market
system for kidneys in general terms).
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Open markets for kidneys are very controversial because they
raise serious ethical issues and
[iut is generally believed by persons of all political and
theoretical stripes that markets in human organs are likely
to compromise the autonomy and well-being of those who
participate in them as vendors, that they are likely to
undermine the well-being of those who receive the body
parts thus procured, that they commodify what should not
be commodified, that they are demeaning to vendors and,
most simply, that such markets are simply viscerally
11 4
repugnant.
One may argue that since people are already buying and
selling kidneys, if the government legalized the transactions, then
the government could better regulate them and protect the
participants.1 1 5 The kidney supply would increase and everyone
6
would benefit."
These benefits, although legitimate, are not enough to
outweigh the consequences. While any type of open market would
eliminate the black market because the commodification of kidneys
would then be legal, any of the open markets are wrought with
moral issues and, as a matter of public policy, cannot be allowed.
Simply, "the commodification of the human body is an affront to
human dignity" because it "would erode respect for persons, and
so would eventually lead to them being seen as nor no more than
11 7
bundles of spare parts."
18
An open market for kidneys can be structured in three ways."
Taylor, supra note 21, at 2.
115 Arthur J. Matas, The Case for Living Kidney Sales: Rationale, Objections and
Concerns, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2007, 2007 (2004) (promoting a regulated
vendor system in the Western world because it would be reasonably easy to
implement, increase the kidney supply, and would be morally permissible). But
see Arthur L. Caplan, Transplantationat Any Price?, 4 AM. J. OF TRANSPLANTATION
1933, 1933 (2004) (opining that Matas and other proponents of an open market do
not make a convincing case because of ample evidence that markets have failed,
and explaining his belief that an open market is morally impermissible because it
results in the exploitation of the poor, the ethical violation of medicine, and
religious opposition).
116 See generally Matas, supra note 115 (arguing that kidney sale could have
certain benefits if legalized).
117 Taylor, supra note 21, at 16.
118 See Erwin Bernat, Marketingof Human Organs?, in A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
BIOETHIcs 162 (Cosimo Marco Mazzoni ed., 1998) (stating the three types of open
markets).
114
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First, a deceased's relatives could sell the kidney to a recipient
either in advance of or upon the deceased's death. 119 Second, a
prospective donor could sell her own kidney, to be transferred to
the recipient upon the donor's death. 120 Third, the donor could
choose to sell her kidney and undergo the nephrectomy while the
donor is still alive. 12' Each of these approaches believes that an
open market is a logical solution to the kidney shortage and black
market, because people are willing to buy and sell kidneys.
An open market for relatives to sell their relative-donor's
kidneys, while the relative-donor is still alive, to someone upon the
relative-donor's death, "clearly violates bonos mores" 22 or good
morals because the relative-donor's kidneys are not the property of
the relatives. Therefore, the relatives have no right to sell the
kidneys. The United States' culture and laws are rooted in the
principle of autonomy; unless a countervailing state interest exists,
the law respects an individual's right to choose what to do to her
body. 123 Allowing a relative to sell their relative-donor's kidney,
then, is in direct conflict with these notions of autonomy.
The same violation occurs with a living donor signing a
contract for the sale of his kidney upon his death. 24 Although the
actual nephrectomy does not occur until the donor's death, the
moment she contracts to sell her kidney, the donation occurs.
These contracts "lead to an impermissible limitation of personal
freedom because they infringe on freedom of choice in highly
personal matters." 25 For instance, if a donor contracted with the
hospital, her decisions concerning medical treatment may be
affected by the terms of the contract. While a donor could breach
the contract if it became too burdensome, the option to enter into
the contract should not exist because of the restrictive nature of
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.

123 See, e.g., Planned Parenthoodof Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding
that an undue burden cannot be placed on a woman seeking an abortion);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 707 (1997) (determining that while an individual
has a right to comnit suicide, an individual does not have a right to have
assistance to commit suicide); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990) (holding that a patient has a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, but
her family members do not have the right to withdraw her life-support).
124 See generally Bernat, supra note 118, at 165 (discussing the ethical
implications of a living person contracting to sell his kidney upon his death).
125 Id.
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such a contract.
A currently living donor selling her kidney for a profit is
considered the most controversial issue of the three types of open
market for kidneys because of its ethical implications: exploitation
of the poor, kidney pricing and quality, notions of altruism, thirdparty influences, physician participation, and cultural and religious
considerations. An open market for kidneys is impermissible
because the ethical concerns associated with it outweigh its
potential of elimination of the black market.
5.1.1.

Exploitation of the poor

A potential proposal should seek to eliminate the abuses of a
black market, such as exploitation of the poor. Under an open
market system, however, there is legitimate fear that exploitation
of the indigent or the "socially underprivileged" 126 would continue
to persist and the poor would suffer from a loss of autonomy.
First:
[a] living provider organ market system may result in a
disproportionate number of poor people selling their
nonviable organs, such as kidneys, to benefit a
disproportionate number of rich organ purchasers. This
could result in a greater number of poor people living in
diminished physical states due solely to their economic
127
misfortune.
In an open market, it is unlikely that a poor person would be
able to afford a kidney. Even if insurance were to cover kidney
costs, the poor people would be responsible for the remainder of
the procedure costs, medications, and follow-up medical care.
Commodification would thus exploit the poor and yield
inequitable access and distribution of kidneys.
Theoretically, in our current health care system, everyone has
access to medical care; the differences lie in the quality of care. If
kidneys were commodified, they would be valued differently
depending on a variety of factors -much like the value of a house.
Those in need of an organ would only be able to afford a kidney
within their price range, which could mean that the quality of
Id. at 169.
See Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most
Vulnerable Participantsin a Commercialized Organ TransplantationSystem, 21 AM. J. L.
AND MED. 45, 80 (1995).
126
127
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kidneys the poor would have access to would not be as high as a
kidney a rich person could afford. Thus, the "poor people would
be priced out of access to organs in [such] compensation systems.
Alternatively, assuming the poor did have equal access to organs,
the organs to which they would have access might be of lesser
quality." 128 Access to necessary organs, such as kidneys, should
not depend on a person's financial ability to obtain one.
Second, indigents would "compromise their autonomy" if
poverty coerced them into selling their kidneys. 129 However, an
individual's decision to sell her kidney could be a rational,
informed choice to make herself financially better off. The
government allows, and society accepts, a number of market
transactions people engage in because they are poor and have no
other choice such as "work[ing] in coal mines, neglect[ing] their
children while working two jobs, join[ing] the military, drop[ing]
130
out of school, [and] sell[ing] family heirlooms" to name a few.
Prohibiting the underprivileged from participating because of their
economic or social situation is leaving them "worse-off in their
own lights." 131 Therefore, someone should be able to participate in
the transaction if she values the price of her kidney more than the
slightly better chance she has of avoiding death or illness because
she has two, instead of one, kidneys. It is unclear where the line
should be drawn between what market transactions are acceptable
132
and what are not.
Although the seller may make a "rational" choice, this is not
the issue. The concern is the "absence of real alternatives. .. choice
is imperiled by high compensation, not because the sellers are
rendered irrational by the prospect of money, but for those in need
of money certain offers, no matter how degrading, are
irresistible." 133 Thus, their choice to sell the organ is not really a
128 Shelby E. Robinson, Organs for Sale? An Analysis of Proposed Systems for
Compensating Organ Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1019, 1041 (1999).
129 TAYLOR, supra note 21, at 14.
130 See Barnett et al.,
supra note 13, at 213.
131 See Hansmann, supra note 22, at 153.

132

Id.

Caplan, supra note 115, at 1933. For example, someone who needs money
could rationally decide to sell her baby, yet we prohibit this practice because it is a
.gross exploitation of the poor if they have no options but to resort to child sales."
Id. While a person may be autonomous in deciding to sell her kidney, having the
option to sell it is an "autonomy-impairing 'constraining option"' because having
the option "will likely lead to the future diminution of either the vendor's own
autonomy, or the autonomy of other persons who are economically
133
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choice, but the result of a lack of alternatives. There are sound
Our
reasons why governments should act paternalistically.
government prohibits certain livelihoods, such as prostitution,
because they are against public policy.1M Selling a kidney differs
from selling labor. 135 Someone can always quit her job and resume
it if she finds nothing better. For example, while a fashion model
may commodify her beauty and use her physical assets to make a
living, she can always stop modeling.
Additionally, selling a kidney is an irreversible, one-time
decision. "[Tihose individuals who would sell a kidney for
commercial motives would ... contain a disproportionate number
of individuals who had acted improvidently -whether from lack
of education or intellect or because circumstances made them
temporarily and irrationally desperate-and who will come to
regret their act." 136 We all make mistakes in life that we cannot
reverse and some of those mistakes we come to regret; however,
selling a kidney is parting with a physical piece of yourself that
cannot be regained and, therefore, the risk of mistake and regret is
greater because peoples' lives could be at issue. For instance, if a
person sold her kidney and a few years later a relative suffered
from kidney failure and needed a transplant, she would be unable
to provide the relative with her other kidney.
Although paternalism could be preserved in an open market
through government regulation (i.e., who can sell kidneys, who
can buy them, at what price they could be sold, and when the
transaction could occur), it is unclear whether these regulations
would help. In many instances, if someone desperately needs a
kidney and someone desperately needs money and is willing to

impoverished." See Taylor, supra note 21, at 14.
134 Prostitution is illegal in most of the U.S.
[T]he giving of sexual intercourse in exchange for something of value is
one of public morality regarding the nature and uses of sex, viz. that
intimate, sexual relations, even in private between consenting adults, are
not to be a matter of commerce because their purpose is to express love
and to beget children within marriage. To allow the sale of sexual
intercourse is to undermine marital fidelity and to cheapen sexuality.
John A. Gray, Sexual Harassment,Prostitution,and the Tort of Abusive Discharge: An
Analysis and Evaluation of Recent Legal Developments, 9 BuFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 169, 187
(2000/2001).
135 See generally Barnett et al., supra note 13, at 213 (discussing why selling a
kidney is different than taking on an exploitative job).
136 See Hansmann, supra note 22, at 153.
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sell a kidney, the two will find a way to transact, even if
regulations won't allow it. Thus, the seller and buyer will have
circumvented the open market and transacted in a black market.
This double market system would detrimentally affect the group of
poor people who decided to transact in the legalized market
because the price they could obtain for their kidneys on the open
market would be devalued by the existence of the black market.
While there would be potential buyers who would prefer to pay
for a kidney in a regulated, open market, there will always be
buyers who are looking for a cheaper deal because all they want is
a kidney. Therefore, it seems that it does not matter whether the
commodification of kidneys is legalized on a regulated, open
market because although some people, like the rich, would transact
in it, the poor still would not reap many of the benefits.
Third, an open market raises concerns about how informed a
seller is in making her decision regarding a variety of issues such
as health consequences, psychological affects, or financial
implications. Donors are not necessarily provided with adequate
information concerning these issues and do not always receive the
proper medical treatment post-nephrectomy. 137 In many cases,
donors do not understand the financial issues and are left no better
off than they were before the sale.13 8 While legalization could
result in the institution of laws in the United States requiring
criteria of informed decision-making to be met before selling an
organ or making medical care for the sellers pre- and postoperation mandatory, such standards would be hard to regulate if
the seller comes from a foreign country.
While an open market may increase the supply of kidneys, it
does not do away with the exploitation of the poor, which is one of
the main abuses of a black market. Further, it is unclear whether
an open market would even eliminate the black market because
those priced out of the system might still find a way to transact.
Thus, in order to effectively and ethically increase the kidney
supply without the existence of a black market, a proposal must
equitably treat and provide options for both the rich and poor.

137 See Berthillier, supra notes 59, at 165-66 (discussing the lack of medical
attention donors received).
138 As discussed in Section 4.2, the suppliers of kidneys are typically indigent
people who cannot afford medical care and are not economically better-off after
the sale of their kidneys.
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Kidney pricing and quality

An open market does not ensure the fair value of a kidney.
Currently, in the United States, there is no price for a kidney per se;
rather, the money kidney recipients pay to the regional nonprofit
organ procurement agencies are for the physicians' services, other
personnel, and medical equipment used to harvest, transport, and
transplant the kidneys. 139 The prices the agencies charge usually
140
just cover their own costs.
In an open market, the kidney price could be set by the
government or by market forces. The government, though, does
not typically become involved in the pricing of goods available on
the open market; however, because of the ethical issues that
surround selling a kidney and the potential to exploit the poor, the
government should step-in to help prevent corruption and abuse
of the market and its participants. If the government sets the price,
this could ensure fair value for all parties involved, and if people
believe they are selling and buying a kidney at a fair price, it could
deter them, from transacting in a black market.
Prices set by market forces could be determined based on
supply and demand. The scarcer a resource, such as a kidney, the
higher the price; a higher price leads to more incentive to supply
the kidney. 141 The more kidneys exist in the market, the less
valuable the organ becomes, and the price naturally lowers.
Besides the natural forces of supply and demand, an item's price in
an open market can also be set by a product's manufacturer who
sets the price to cover the production costs and make some profit.
Kidneys, though, are not manufactured in a warehouse; there is no
production cost associated with it to serve as a baseline for its
price.
Regardless of whether the market or the government sets the
price, there is question concerning how a kidney would be valued.
Although a market will value the kidney automatically, it seems
inevitable that there will be debate about how to set the values,
even if the government were to set the price. It seems there could
also be price differences based on the quality of a kidney.
Although the kidney itself is standard in that every person has
139 See Hansmann, supranote 22, at 149 (discussing what the price people pay
for kidney transplants entails).
140 Id.
141 See Barnett et al., supra note 13, at 210-211 (explaining, generally, how an
open market would work and how it would affect the price of a kidney).
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two, kidneys serve the same functions, and the general size and
shape is the same, the quality of a kidney could greatly vary. For
instance, a person can buy an ordinary baseball in a sports store for
a certain price. But, the person will pay a higher price for a
baseball with a Babe Ruth signature on it because it is rarer.
Like baseballs, some kidneys are ordinary and some are rare.
A kidney needs to be matched by blood type in order to ensure
that the recipient's body will not reject it, which would render the
transplant unsuccessful. 142 Certain blood types are rarer than
others. Should those rarer kidneys be valued more, like the
baseball with the Babe Ruth signature? Further, a kidney from a
man who is in his sixties and had a habit of drinking a lot in his
younger years would seem to be less valuable than a kidney from a
man who is in his twenties with no health problems. And, if a
wealthy person would sell his kidney, how would a kidney from
Bill Gates, for instance, be valued compared to a kidney from
someone in prison? Before establishing an open market, criteria
would need to be established to determine the fair value of the
varying types of kidneys to prevent market abuses, make sure
sellers' are not taken advantage of, and that buyers' expectations
are protected.
In addition to problems pricing kidneys, there is concern about
the quality of kidneys; those likely to sell a kidney because of the
financial incentive might be those whose kidneys would be of
lesser quality because of lifestyle choices such as drinking or
drugs. 143 Furthermore, a worrisome issue is that people desperate
for money and looking to sell their kidneys could lie about their
health problems, which would otherwise impede them from being
a kidney donor. Additionally, medical tests cannot pick up all
diseases, so we cannot rely on them to catch the health issues
people may have lied about in order to donate and collect the
money.
Therefore, without some type of supplemental
enforcement or screening criteria that does not simply rely on
people's disclosure and medical testing, it would be difficult to
ensure that people do not falsify their health status and put the
kidney recipients' health in jeopardy.
142 See generally Nat'l Kidney Found., Programsfor Donor/Recipient Pairs with
Incompatible Blood Types, available at http://www.kidney.org/transplantation/
livingDonors/infoPrograms.cfm (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (summarizing the
issue of blood type compatability).
143 See Robinson, supra note 128, at 1044-50 (addressing the criticisms and
concerns of establishing an open market for kidneys).
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An open market aims to protect the interests of the parties
involved by regulating the price of kidneys. However, because of
the potential differences in kidney quality, it is unclear whether an
open market could meet its goal. Commodifying the kidney does
not solve the abuses of a black market, such as inequitable pricing
and quality; therefore, a solution is needed that focuses on
increasing the kidney supply by targeting potential cadaveric and
living donors without directly offering them cash for their kidneys.
5.1.3.

Altruism and the slippery slope

The United States' system for kidney procurement is currently
based on altruism; however, commodifying the kidney in an open
market would mean the elimination of voluntarily donations of
kidneys while an individual is alive or upon the individual's death.
While there would still be altruistic people, the majority would be
tempted by monetary gain and sell, rather than donate, their
kidney. If person A plans on donating her kidney when she dies,
she might as well make some profit for herself or her family while
she is alive.
A slippery slope also develops with the commodification of
kidneys.
"[O]nce organ sales are permitted as a matter of
principle, the moral high ground will be lost and it will be difficult
or impossible to withstand market forces that seek to promote
increasing commercialization of the body and further erosion of
the inherent rights of personhood." 144 Allowing a kidney to have a
price would make it hard to draw the line in determining what
other organs could have a price tag. Commodification of the
kidney opens the door to putting a price tag on someone's liver or
heart, which is troublesome because a person only has one of either
organ. Thus, if the price is high enough and a person's family
desperately needed money, a person could sell that organ and
effectively kill herself. Or, someone who is contemplating suicide
could use the extraction of her heart or kidney as a means to end
her life while leaving her loved ones some money.
It would seem for public policy reasons that the government
would not want to encourage suicide by offering what people
could view as a financial benefit. Additionally, this country does
not allow physician assisted-suicide. 145 Allowing the sale of a heart
144 Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures
Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 23 (1994).
145 In Washington v. Glucksburg, the Supreme Court of the United States held
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or lung would require a physician to remove the organ, thereby
killing the patient. Not only is this against current law because it
could be viewed as assisted-suicide, but it is against the medical
ethics requirement to "do no harm." 146 Further, as science and
technology develop, we may be able to price other bodily
components such as a person's DNA, which is worrisome because
a person's DNA is the core and foundation of their physical
identity. For public policy reasons, society should not place a
monetary value on a person because we are all unique human
beings.
An open market reduces the likelihood of altruistic organ
donation, which undermines the policies United States' laws are
based. It also creates a slippery slope of what other body parts
could be commodified. These results of an open market are
ethically troubling and a proposal is needed that will respect our
notions of altruism in kidney donation and protect the
invaluableness of our organs.
5.1.4.

Third-Partyinfluences

An open market for kidneys raises ethical implications because
of the potential family conflict it could promote. A family member
who is financially strapped might be tempted to sell a deceased
relative's kidney or, worse yet, "pull the plug" earlier on a relative
if she knows that she would be compensated for her relative's
kidney. 147 In the most extreme circumstance, if an individual
knows her family faces financial difficulties, she might commit
148
suicide in order to provide them with her organs for them to sell.
Allowing a living person to sell her kidney could also create a
that a state statute banning assisted-suicide was constitutional because it was
rationally related to a government interest. The Court recognized that the history,
legal traditions, and practice support criminalizing assisted suicide and that the
government's interest in preserving human life and upholding the ethics of the
medical profession was a legitimate interest. See generally Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 707 (1997) (determining that while an individual has a right
to commit suicide, an individual does not have a right to have assistance to
commit suicide).
146 The Hippocratic Oath that physicians take requires them to "do no harm"
to their patients. Removing a vital organ such as a heart or lung from a healthy,
living patient would violate this principle.
147 See Robinson, supra note 128, at 1042 (expressing why there is concern
over what family members might do in tough situations if they need money and
could receive a monetary gain from selling a relative's kidney).
148 Id.
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situation where a third party, such as a person to whom the
potential seller owes a debt, may exert pressure on the potential
seller to engage in the transaction. Or, a family member could be
in a dire financial situation and ask the potential seller to sell her
kidney. The potential seller could feel compelled to sell her kidney
because of family dynamics and pressure. Thus, the potential
seller does not seem to make the choice to sell if she is forced or
coerced into the sale because of a third-party influence. The
potential seller would be stuck in between the proverbial "rock and
a hard place" because she would lack any real alternatives; the
choices are either suffering the consequences of owing the thirdparty debt, and have something happen to her family member, or
earning money by selling a part of her body. If the consequences
of the potential seller not selling her kidney are drastic to her, she
would have no choice but to sell her kidney in order to avoid the
alternative consequences.
There are scenarios, however, where selling a kidney might be
acceptable such as someone selling her kidney to pay for her sick
child's medical expenses. While these types of scenarios present a
compelling reason to allow for the sale of kidneys, people should
not have the option to sell their kidney because the potential
situations where a person is coerced into selling her kidney
because of a lack of alternatives are more ethically troublesome.
An ethically effective proposal, thus, should recognize the pressure
third-party influences can exert and limit strong financial
incentives, such as commodifying a kidney, to protect the potential
donor's autonomy.
5.1.5.

Physician participation

An open market requires physician participation in the sale of
kidneys, which violates a central tenet of the medical profession:
"do no harm." 149 The principle of "do no harm," also known as
non-malfeasance, holds that medical intervention should be
beneficial. 150 Unless the living person is having her kidney
149 See Caplan, supra note 115, at 1934 (commenting that a key moral problem
with markets in kidneys and other body parts is what it does to the ethics of the
medical profession). See also LUDWIG EDELSTEN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT,

TRANSLATION, AND INTERPRETATION

(Ludwig Edelstein trans., 1943) (explaining the

various principles that doctors agree to abide by when they take the oath).
150 See Nancy Scheper-Hughes, Bodies of Apartheid: the Ethics and Economics of
Organ Transplantationin South Africa, available at http://pascalfroissartonline.fr/3cache/1999-scheperhughes.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) (summarizing the

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 27:1

removed and undergoing harm solely to help another living
person, taking organs from a living person seeking to make a profit
151
seems to directly violate this principle.
Even if the buyer and the seller are both the physician's
patients, and causing harm to one patient is for the benefit of
another, a doctor's obligations lie individually with each patient;
just because the buyer may benefit does not negate the harm to the
seller. While a patient's autonomy is respected, and is considered
by the physician when making treatment decisions, the principle of
"do no harm" must be given weight. Situations could arise where
a patient is seemingly making an autonomous decision to have her
kidney removed; however, she could be forced or coerced into
selling to make money. In these cases, the principle does trump a
patient's autonomy because it is the physician's ethical obligation
to consider the total moral permissibility of the procedure. Even
though there is little data on physicians' opinions concerning
markets, the data that does exist indicates that healthcare providers
152
oppose the idea of a market system for kidneys.
An open market could force a physician to disregard medical
ethics by creating a situation where a patient's autonomy always
trumps the basic tenet of "do no harm," even if the physician
Similar
believes the procedure is ethically impermissible.
situations, of course, occur in medicine every day, but a system
should not be created that actually constructs these scenarios. A
permissible proposal should encourage physicians to openly
discuss kidney donation with their patients rather than potentially
violating an ethical tenet of their profession.
5.1.6.

Culturaland religious considerations

An open market could potentially alienate cultural groups.
Certain cultures, like the Japanese who view every part of the
various ethical concerns involved in kidney transplants).
151 See Caplan, supra note 115, at 1934 (distinguishing an altruistic donor from
one that is selling her kidney, and arguing that creating a market would place
doctors in a position where they are harming someone only interested in gaining
compensation, and that doctors' roles are to help people get better and alleviate
their pain, not to aid them in making a profit through permanent and significant
harm).
152 See J.D. Jasper et al., Altruism, Incentives and Organ Donation: Attitudes of
the Transplant Community, 42 MED. CARE 378, 380-81 (2004) (revealing that the
physicians who participated in the study did not find a $1500 cash incentive or
health insurance rebate to be "morally appropriate").
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deceased's body as part of the deceased's body and soul, 1 53 would
likely find the concept of an open market repugnant. Even within
the United States, it is likely that groups may not favor an open
market for body parts based on historical experiences regarding
4
slavery or their notions of distrust of the medical profession.l
Establishing an open market for kidneys could also offend the
tenets of some of the world's major religions. 155 Pope John Paul II
made the Catholic Church's position against a market for kidneys
no secret. 156 In the Church's view, an individual does not own her
57
body; rather it is a gift from God and she is merely the steward.
Thus, because it is a gift, she should not harm or mutilate it unless
the goal truly is to assist someone else.1 58 Because Catholics
account for one-third of the organs donated, creating a market for
kidneys may alienate many potential donors, which would have a
negative impact on the supply of kidneys. 5 9 While Catholics could
153 Although the Japanese have accepted the effects of modem medicine and
while many do equate brain death as equivalent to human death, the Japanese
view of the human body is different than a Western view, which could be a reason
why people do not wish to donate their organs. See Masahiro Morioka, Bioethics
and Japanese Culture: Brain Death, Patients' Rights, and Cultural Factors, 5 EUBIOS J.
OF ASIAN AND INT'L BIoETHIcS 87, 87-90 (1995) (illustrating how the Japanese have
responded to newly imported bioethical ideas by examining their discourse on
brain death and patient's rights).
154 See W.J. Minniefield et al., Differences in Attitudes Toward Organ Donation
Among African Americans and Mhites in the United States, 93 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N
372-379 (2001) (noting possible reasons why African Americans may have
negative attitudes towards organ donation). See also Caplan et al., infra note 157,
at 221 (recognizing that slaves were often used by physicians for experimentation
without their consent, and "for autopsy and teaching purposes" after they died).
155 See Caplan, supra note 115, at 1934 (claiming that major world religions
would not support creating an open market, which could have a detrimental
impact on the number of organ donors).
156 See id. ("The Pope, for example, has made himself quite clear about the
Catholic church's aversion to markets in organs.").
157 Arthur L. Caplan, Emmanuel and Robert Hart Professor of Bioethics, Dir.,
Ctr. for Bioethics, Univ. of Pa., Speech at the University of Pennsylvania Forum:
What is Wrong with Markets Using Living Persons to Increase the Supply of
Organs? (Dec. 6, 2005); see also Arthur L. Caplan et al., Financial Compensationfor
Cadaver Organ Donation: Good Idea or Anathema?, in THE ETHIcs OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13, at 222 (recognizing that major religions are hesitant
about organ procurement and only allow it for the narrow purpose of helping
another human being, and that many of these religions oppose commodification
because it would view the body as property of the individual rather than as a gift
from God).
158 Id. (describing religious endorsement of the use of organs from cadavers
only under certain limited circumstances).
159 See also Caplan, supra note 115, at 1934 (hypothesizing the potential effect
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still donate an organ, they might find an open market appalling
enough to decline to participate at all.
It is likely that the Muslim faith would also be opposed to an
open market. For Muslims, while "the general population tends to
feel positively toward donation, guidelines set limits, including
that: transplants occur only when no other treatment is available,
that the procedure has a good chance of success, that voluntary
consent is obtained from either the donor or the next of kin to
procure the organs, and that death has accurately been
pronounced." 160 Like Catholics, Muslims believe in the sacredness
of the human body and allow organ donation because of a
responsibility to help others as long as no harm is inflicted upon
the donor herself.161 Thus, it seems that Islam would oppose an
open market because it would take away from the altruistic nature
of kidney donation.
An open market would offend the basic tenets of some of the
world's most practiced religions. We cannot afford to alienate
these groups from donating. Therefore, a proposal is needed that
respects the religious and cultural ideas that may inhibit kidney
donation through education and open discussion about the kidney
shortage and procurement procedure.
5.2. FuturesMarket
Another form of commodifying kidneys is a futures market, or
"posthumous organ market," 162 for kidneys. A futures market
involves purchasing "the right to harvest a person's organs upon
his death . . .from him far in advance, while he is alive and
well." 163 A future donor can either contractually create an
irrevocable transfer of the right to the kidney, (which would be an
open market for the future right to the kidney), or it could create a
temporary right (for example, a right for one year renewable
annually). Similar to an open market, ethical concerns center on a
potential donor's autonomy and third-party influence in a futures
market. While these concerns are not as troubling as in an open
an open market would have on donors who have religious affiliations).
160 ROBERT M. VEATCH, TRANSPLANTATION ETHICs 9 (2000).
161 See id. at 17 (citing the Islamic Code of Medical Ethics, which states "the
individual patient is the collective responsibility of the Society, that has to ensure
his health needs by any means inflicting no harm on others.").
162 Crespi, supra note 144, at 24.
163 Hansmann, supra note 22, at 147.
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market because there is no direct payment, the kidneys are still
commodified and there is still the potential to exploit the poor.
Additionally, a futures market alone cannot solve the kidney
shortage because of the limited number of cadavers that could be
used for kidney procurement. Thus, an effective proposal could
draw on some of the components of a futures market, but would
simultaneously need to focus on increasing living donation.
5.2.1.

Futures market involving health insurance

Several scholars have put forth various proposals for futures
markets. One such proposal comes from Henry Hansmann, who
proposes a futures market where the health insurance companies,
through their agents, would purchase the future rights to a
policyholder's kidneys when the policyholder signs up for a policy
period. 64 Purchasing the future rights to policyholders' kidneys,
however, does not need to be limited to health insurance
companies. Other insurance agencies that sell life, automobile, or
property insurance could enter similar agreements with the
65
policyholder.1
Integrating the right to purchase organs with the sale of
insurance seems natural since "these companies are already
involved in the types of actuarial calculations and financial
transactions that would be involved." 166 An individual would
simply check-off a box on her annual premium statement, which
would signify that if she died within the time period of the
insurance coverage, the insurance company would have the right
to harvest the organs that were transplantable. 167 In return, the
individual would receive a deduction on the insurance premium
she paid for that term. 68 The individual would also be free to
change the agreement every time her policy came up for
The insurance company would then send the
renewal. 69
individual's name to a national registry that a hospital would
164 See Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human
Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL'Y & L. 57, 61-71 (1989) (putting forth "[f]easible designs
for a[n organs] market").
165 See Hansmann, supra note 22, at 148 (describing other options for futures
markets).
166

Id.

167

See id. (explaining how the health insurance futures market would work).

168 Id.
169

Id.
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check each time someone died. 170 If the registry listed the name,
the hospital would enter data about the transplantable organs, and
a suitable recipient would be found through a national matching
network linked to the registry.171 Finally, the recipient would "pay
the deceased's insurance company, or their assignee, the latter's
specified price for an organ upon accepting it for transplant." 172
Setting the price, or premium reduction, an insurance company
would pay for the future right to the organ would depend on the
price they could receive for the organ at the time of removal. The
insurance industry is competitive and, therefore, the "companies
would be able to take only a market rate of return for their efforts
as intermediaries in such transactions; the rest of the (expected)
price received by the insurance companies for the harvested organs
would be passed through to their policyholders in the premium
reductions offered them." 173 One way to determine the price of the
harvested kidney would be to let the natural market forces of
supply and demand set the price. The government could also
establish the price. It is important to remember, however, that this
type of futures market system only works if the price of the organ
is "high enough to make the value of the future rights in the
policyholder's organs large enough to cover the costs to the
insurers of administering the system" 174 with enough remaining to
offer a premium reduction large enough to induce the
policyholder's agreement.
A futures market involving health insurance companies might
be one way to increase the supply of available kidneys. Most
individuals are not morally opposed to donating; most just do not
donate because of "inertia, mild doubts about their preferences, a
slight distaste for considering the subject, or the inconvenience in
completing or carrying a donor card." 175 Insurance premium
reductions would draw attention to donating because there would
be some incentive involved. 176 Additionally, because health
insurance companies also have an interest in getting donations,
170

Id.

Id.
See Hansmann, supra note 22, at 148 (describing further the mechanism of
a health insurance futures market).
171
172

173

Id.

174

Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.

175

176 See id. (explaining how premium reductions would draw people's
attention to the possibility of donating).
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their solicitation of individuals would heighten awareness about
donating kidneys. 177
5.2.2.

Futures market with benefits to the deceased's estate

Lloyd Cohen argues that, "a system which binds the organ
provider during life is unnecessary and undesirable" because of
the loss of individual autonomy; however, he also suggests that "a
system of renewable, annual organ procurement contracts should
be used" because it "would authorize the creation of contingent or
option contracts which only become effective upon the death of the
organ provider, at which time the remuneration would be paid to
Cohen's proposal is similar to
the decedent's estate." 178
Hansmann's health insurance proposal, except that in the former
the decedent could designate a beneficiary who would receive the
funds for the sale of her kidney upon the decedent's death.1 79 The
price for the kidneys would be set either by the market or the
180
government.
In order to ensure that the hospital maintains the kidney in
harvestable condition until the transportation arrangements are
made, the parties could bring a negligence cause of action against
the hospital and "the hospital would be liable for the value of any
resulting loss should it fail to exercise reasonable care in its
notification and organ preservation efforts." 181 Lastly, Cohen
would allow for parents to consent to organ donation for their
children as long as they would donate their organs on the same
82
terms.1
A futures market could help enhance the supply of kidneys
while avoiding the "entire parade of horribles regularly invoked
by opponents of commercialization." 183 Gregory Crespi believes
that a futures market wherein the procurement contracts could be
Id.
Banks, supra note 127, at 76.
179 Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a
Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) (proposing an alternative futures
market).
180 See id. (discussing the question of who would set the price for kidneys).
181 Id.
182 See id. (describing the conditions under which parents can consent to their
child donating a kidney).
183 Crespi, supra note 142, at 6-7 (discussing a futures market designed so that
someone who is in desperate need of money won't feel compelled to sell an
organ).
177
178

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol. 27:1

renewed annually, "would reduce the likelihood of potential
abuses against the poor and other vulnerable groups because the
sale of human organs would be effective only upon the death of
the decedent, and the decedent's surviving relatives would be
prohibited from selling the decedent's organs." 18 4 A futures
market system would provide a sufficient financial incentive to
clear out any opposition, such as a family's hesitation to allow the
dissection of a loved one for her organs. 8 5
A futures market where an individual can renew her decision
to donate a kidney upon her death seems to allay concerns about
the loss of individual autonomy resulting from a person's decision
to contract away her right to her body. The individual would have
the right to terminate her decision whenever she renews her policy.
Additionally, the decision to donate is actually made by the
individual when she is alive and healthy, and has time to discuss
her decision with family and friends. 8 6 In contrast, many of the
other kidney donation proposals involve putting pressure on the
family to make a decision about the individual's organs
immediately following her death.
This places a lot of
psychological pressure on the family during an emotional time.187
However, although a futures market takes the decisionmaking
power away from the next of kin, an individual may be hesitant to
participate in a futures market because her next of kin may not be
comfortable with the idea of having her body cut up and parts
removed upon her death.188
Because the kidney is still commodified in a futures market,
there would be similar issues raised involving the pricing and
quality of kidneys that an open market would encounter.
Additionally, a futures market that provides financial
compensation to a decedent's estate upon her death, even if
renewed annually, does not eliminate the ethical concern of thirdparty influences. If a family is in desperate need of money, it is
Banks, supra note 127, at 76.
See Cohen, supra note 179, at 34-35 (describing a futures market as the
solution to flushing out the blockage to procuring organs).
186 See Hansmann, supra note 22, at 151 (explaining that one benefit of the
futures market is that individuals can make a decision when they are alive and
healthy).
187 See id. (describing the psychological pressure a family may feel when
faced with a relative's death and the potential decision to sell her organs).
188 See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 157, at 221 ("In practice, families often do not
donate because they do not want their relative to undergo further 'suffering."').
184
185
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plausible that they would end a loved one's life support earlier
than necessary to collect the money for remuneration. It is also
unclear whether a futures market would eliminate the exploitation
of the poor in terms of opportunity and access. It seems that the
poor may be shut out of this system because they are less likely to
have insurance; thus, they would lack a benefit that the rich would
have.
On the surface, it appears a futures market would discourage
volunteerism because of the financial incentive involved.189 While
money adds an incentive for potential cadaveric donors, however,
one's perception of altruism depends on how the option is
phrased. 190 For instance, people are typically asked, "would you
sell your right to your kidney for $40 a year?" But, what if the
question were phrased as, "are you willing to pay an extra $40 a
year in health insurance premiums for the privilege of refusing to
make your organs available to several other people when you
die?" 191 When phrased the latter way, if a person chooses not to
donate, he will appear selfish, which would increase "altruistically
192
motivated donations."
While a futures market is not as ethically troubling as an open
market, it still raises concerns about autonomy and third-party
influences if money is given to a potential donor's family upon her
death. It is also important to remember that there will never be
enough cadaveric donors to ensure an adequate supply of kidneys
because the donors must be brain dead, and there are a limited
number of deaths that meet this qualification. Therefore, a futures
market alone will not cure the problem of a black market.
5.3. Presumed Consentfor CadavericOrgan Donation
Another possible solution to the kidney shortage and black
market is to have presumed consent for cadaveric kidney donation
in the United States;1 93 however, this system would be hard to
189 See generally Hansmann, supra note 22, at 150 (explaining a concern that
futures markets will decrease altruism and proponents' response and solution to
that the counter argument).
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. (providing an example of how a question's wording can affect the
mindset of the listener).
193 See NORA MACHADO, USING THE BODIES OF THE DEAD: LEGAL, ETHICAL AND
ORGANISATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 44 (1998) (describing

the various countries and their organ donation laws).
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implement because of this country's notions of autonomy.
Currently, the United States does not have this system in place
because of its long-standing belief in individual and property
rights. 94 Presumed consent has been successful in other countries
195
such as Italy, Sweden, Spain, France, Austria, and Belgium,
countries that tend to have a "history of high level state
intervention and/or authoritarian rule." 196
Conclusions that
presumed consent systems generate a higher rate of kidney
procurement, however, are arguable. 97 If the United States were
to adopt such a system, it should draw on foreign countries as
examples and would need to work with the medical profession to
194 See id. (explaining one reason the United States does not support
presumed consent). Additionally, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands do not
have a system of presumed consent. See WHO, supra note 50 (discussing
Germany's donation law, which declares that any person may have an organ
donor card stating whether she is a donor, not a donor, or she can delegate the
decision to her next of kin. The Act even has age minima for making the
decisions. Further, the Act discusses when the removal of organs of a dead
person is permissible and in cases where the person does not have a donor card
indicating her preferences, the physician is to ask her next-of-kin based on a
relationship as defined by the Act); MACHADO, supra note 193, at 44 (noting that
the Netherlands does not have presumed consent).
195 See Decree of 8 April 2000, Gazz. Uff. No. 89 (Italy) (declaring that citizens
shall receive a memo asking them to declare whether they agree to donate their
organs upon their death or wish to opt out. If a citizen does not return the memo
within 90 days, and their organ donation wishes are unknown, then it will be
presumed that they consented to donate. Further, if a citizen does not get a memo
in the mail, she can go to a hospital or sanitary unit to declare her choice. For
citizens who wish to opt out, their intentions must be entered into a national
registry. If a citizen's wishes are unknown, her next-of-kin can show a signed
proof of her intent, even if she originally said "yes," but the next-of-kin has proof
that she changed her mind to "no," and vice versa. Lastly, a citizen has the right
to change her mind at any time). See also MACHADO, supra note 193, at 46
(providing examples of countries with presumed consent); R.M. Veatch & J.B. Pitt,
The Myth of Presumed Consent: Ethical Problems in New Organ Procurement
Strategies, in THE ETHiCS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13, at 175 (affirming
that Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Spain have presumed consent laws in addition to
Finland, Norway, and Switzerland as well as other countries).
196 MACHADO, supra note 193, at 45.
197

See

e.g.

DAVID

PRICE,

LEGAL

AND

ETHICAL

ASPECTS

OF

ORGAN

TRANSPLANTATION 1, 87-92 (2000) (explaining that proponents of a presumed
consent system tout it as the most effective system for procuring kidneys, but the
conclusions of analysts differ. The author looks at Austria, Belgium, and
Singapore and notes that while these countries have high procurement rates, it is
unclear whether it is because of their presumed consent laws or because of other
factors). But see Christian Williams, Combating the Problems of Human Rights Abuses
and Inadequate Organ Supply Through Presumed Donative Consent, 26 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 315, 340 (1994) ("Presumed consent, when strictly followed by the state,
has proven to be the best practiced method of maximizing organ procurement.").
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modify views of autonomy as they relate to organ donation. They
would do so in hope that the public will accept government
intervention to procure organs so that presumed consent would be
accepted and successful in the United States.
Generally, presumed consent means that individuals are
presumed to donate their organs upon their death unless they
indicate otherwise; thus, the burden is on the individual to "opt
out." 198 Presumed consent systems fall into two categories:
pure/strong presumed consent or weak presumed consent.
Presumed consent regimes differ in whether they consider solely
an individual's decision to opt out or if they will defer to the
decision of the family or next-of-kin if the desires of the deceased
are unknown. 199 In Austria, for instance, the country follows a
"pure informed consent system," which procures the decedent's
organs, unless the decedent filed objection while she was alive, and
20 0
the system does not consider the decedent's next-of-kin's wishes.
A weak presumed consent system, such as in France, seeks the
approval of the deceased's next-of-kin before removing the
organs. 201 Belgium also utilizes a weak presumed consent system
where its citizens register whether they will donate their organs in
a computerized national registry, which only the transplant centers
have access to. 202 The physician, then, has the freedom and
The presumed consent system is based on the notion that "people would
consent if asked.., to a policy of taking organs without explicit permission." The
reasoning behind the policy is that it is permissible to take organs from people
upon their death because, if they were asked whether they would donate when
they were alive and competent, they would have agreed. See Veatch, supra note
195, at 176 (explaining the premise of presumed consent).
199 See MACHADO, supra note 193, at 45 (commenting on presumed consent
systems).
A
200 See Sean R. Fitzgibbons, Cadaveric Organ Donation and Consent:
Comparative Analysis of the United States, Japan, Singapore, and China, 6 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP L. 73, 97 (1999) (offering alternative explanations for Austria's high rate of
organ procurement). Austria, thus, has procured sixty kidneys for every million
people. While this rate may still seem low, it is double that of the United States
and most other European countries. Even those European countries with a lower
procurement rate than Austria still have a higher rate than the United States,
which might be why seventy-eight percent of physicians in the United States
favor presumed consent. See Williams, supra note 197, at 340-41 (explaining the
rate of organ procurement).
201 See MACHADO, supra note 193, at 46 (describing a weak presumed consent
system and noting that most legislation does not include a provision about asking
the next-of-kin even though that is what is practiced).
202 Laurie G. Futterman, Presumed Consent: The Solution to the Critical Donor
Shortage?, in THE ETHIcs OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13, at 167 (explaining
Belgium's system of organ donation as an example of presumed consent).
198
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discretion to act according to her own ethics "within the limits of
the recorded decision of the donor and the right of the family to
object," which is one reason the Belgium system is so successful in
20 3
procuring organs.
The presumed consent option has its ethical drawbacks,
however, which make it an unacceptable proposal. First, there is a
20 4
loss of autonomy in making personal choices about one's body.
The state should not have the right to make such personal choices
and place the burden on the individual to object. A further
problem is that people might not be educated about presumed
consent, what it means, and their right to opt out. "[Presumed
consent will 'lead to a situation where the poor, the uneducated,
and the legally disenfranchised might bear a disadvantageous
burden, and only the more advantaged groups would exercise
autonomy,' since only the more advantaged groups would be
aware of their right to opt out."20 5 Thus, it is problematic that
individuals suffer a loss of autonomy not only because of a
presumed consent system, but also because they do not have a full
understanding of their rights, which is necessary to make an
informed decision.
Additionally, allowing family members to determine what
their relative would have wanted to do with her own corpse raises
further concerns over individual autonomy. There is no guarantee
that the family members' decision would reflect what the
individual would have wanted; 206 however, even if we were to
determine that an individual loses her right to autonomy upon her
death, presumed consent still poses a problem for determining
whether the deceased's family or the state has the right to choose
what to do with the kidney. It would appear that under a strong
presumed consent regime, the state infringes on the family's right
to choose as the deceased's next of kin. In the United States, the
government does recognize the rights of a deceased's next of kin.
For example, many states allow a deceased's estate to pass to her
next of kin if there is no will; it would be logical, then, that a family
Id.
See generally Veatch & Pitt, supra note 195, at 177 (explaining that there is a
difference between "giving" and "taking," and in Western societies, the
individual is given the right to determine what is done to her body).
205 Williams, supra note 197, at 343 (quoting David Lamb, ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS AND ETHics 135, 142 (1996).
206 See id. (explaining why presumed consent systems that ask for the
deceased donor's preferences before procuring her organs are problematic).
203

204
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should retain the right to determine what happens to its loved
one's body after her death.
Lastly, presumed consent takes away from the altruism in
actively donating an organ.2 07 Rather than voluntarily donating a
kidney for a good cause, the donors are in the system because they
have to be. Although the need for kidneys is great, the United
States' policy on organ donation is rooted in notions of altruism.
To take such an extreme step from a purely voluntary system to
one of presumed consent would be a huge shock to the public,
which could mean more resistance than if the public were eased
into a weak version of the system through education and
advertising campaigns.
Presumed consent can also be taken to the extreme: consider,
for example, China. It is common practice for the Chinese
government to execute its criminals as one way to procure organs
to meet demand. 20 8 In China, about 100,000 kidneys are needed for
transplantation each year and, clearly, these are not going to come
from voluntary donors. 20 9 Therefore, the Chinese government has
warped presumed consent to mean that if you commit a crime, you
give your organs to the government, which is problematic because
the punishment should fit the crime. The crime should not be the
vehicle for kidney procurement; this is a gross violation of human
rights. China thus supports the inhumane practice of killing its
prisoners to harvest their organs.
In 1997, China executed 4,367 of its citizens who supposedly
committed one of the sixty-eight crimes punishable by death and,
of those executed, ninety percent of them had their organs
harvested. 210 Chinese officials deny the practice and claim that
they only procure the organs of deceased prisoners if the prisoner's
body is not claimed, 211 the prisoner donated her body for medical
Id.
See Organs Watch, Hot Spots, at http://sunsite3.berkeley.edu/biotech/
organswatch/pages/china.html (last visited Feb 18, 2006) (stating that China
executes its prisoners to harvest and sell organs); Fitzgibbons, supra note 200, at
100-04 (discussing China's "disturbing practice" of harvesting organs from
executed prisoners).
209 See id.
210 See id. at 102 (providing statistics concerning the percentage of Chinese
prisoners executed for organs); see also Illegal Human Organ Trade from Executed
Prisoners in China, supra note 57 (listing examples of petty crimes criminals are
put to death for in China).
211 However, because of China's large size, a deceased's family may not be
able to get to the deceased's body within the time frame required by the
207

208
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use, or the prisoner's family consents. 212
The Chinese practice of harvesting the organs of executed
prisoners could seem acceptable. After all, they are going to die, so
some benefit should be derived from their deaths. 213 This practice
is unacceptable, however, because even though these are criminals,
they are still humans who maintain their right to humane
treatment and integrity.
To presume their consent through
of human rights.214
violation
gross
a
is
execution
Presumed consent raises serious ethical concerns because of
our notions of autonomy. The system, however, has had success in
other countries; therefore, a proposal that can incorporate certain
aspects of presumption, without fully becoming a strong, or even
weak, presumed consent system, combined with education and
discussion about kidney procurement and individual rights, could
be ethically acceptable and successful in increasing the supply of
kidneys.
6.

A PROPOSAL

According to public opinion surveys, a majority of the United
States population is not opposed to donating an organ such as a
kidney. 215 There is still, however, a shortage of kidneys, which
government, or the government may not provide a reasonable amount of time for
the family to retrieve the body. See Organs for Sale, supra note 58.
212 See Illegal Human Organ Trade from Executed Prisoners in China, supra
note 57 (noting the Chinese government's responses to claims that it is violating
human rights). Physicians who participate in this program are also silent about it.
See Scheper-Hughes, supra note 150 (relating a story about China's well-known
practice of executing prisoners to harvest their organs). Stories of these prisoner
executions have come to light through organizations like Amnesty International
and OrgansWatch. For instance, Mr. Lin of San Francisco, California related a
story to OrgansWatch of a visit to a friend who was in a medical center in
Shanghai. A patient in the bed next to his friend was a "wealthy, and politically
well-situated professional man" who told Mr. Lin he was waiting for a kidney
that was coming from an executed prisoner the next morning. The man said that
as soon as the prisoner was shot in the head, doctors would immediately remove
his kidneys and rush them to the medical center for the transplant teams to
transplant.
213 Rothman, supra note 24 (criticizing and expressing worry about the organ
procurement process in China).
214 Further, the Chinese process is "hidden and, therefore, subject to gross
abuse." Id. Additionally, the covert nature of the practice seems to contradict the
claims that voluntary consent is obtained and that by using doctors in the process,
the ethical integrity of the profession is protected. See id.
215 Of the 20,000 people that die each year in the United States under
circumstances that would allow their organs to be transplanted, only 15% actually
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seems to indicate that although people are not opposed to
donating, they are not taking sufficient affirmative steps to donate
their kidneys. This gap could be attributed to laziness, apathy, or
lack of knowledge about how to donate. Therefore, it is of crucial
importance to find a way to close this gap. After reviewing and
analyzing the proposals to increase the supply of kidneys for
transplants, because of its effectiveness and ethical permissibility,
the most viable option for increasing the kidney supply would be a
hybrid of presumptivity, an improved publicity and education
campaign, and a weak form of monetary incentives. In this way,
our notions of autonomy and altruism are not fully abandoned,
and weak economic incentives are used to help supplement the
216
campaign to increase kidney donors.
The number of kidneys that come from cadavers is always
going to be limited because the kidneys must come from brain
dead cadavers. Therefore, this proposal seeks to increase the
number of cadaveric as well as living donors. First, presumptivity
and an improved publicity and education campaign would
increase awareness of the kidney shortage and of steps people can
take while still alive, which would aid in boosting the number of
cadaveric as well as living donors. Second, weak incentives like
tax deductions for expenses related to kidney donation combined
with a weak futures market would help maximize the number of
kidneys that come from cadaveric and living donors. Lastly, this
proposal's programs should be re-evaluated every five years to
assess their effectiveness and to implement any necessary changes,
especially as scientific advances lead to new medical
developments. No proposal will ever be without some flaws, and
there is always going to be a group of people who just will not
donate their kidneys, but this proposal is the best chance for the
have their organs "harvested." See Hansmann, supra note 22 (noting United States
kidney donation statistics). In a poll taken in 1993, Gallup reported that 55% of
Americans said they would be willing to donate their organs; however, only 28%
had a signed organ donor card or indicated that they were donors on their
driver's licenses. Gallup Poll, The American Public's Attitudes Toward Organ
Donationand Transplantation(Feb. 1993), at, http://www.transweb.org/reference/
articles/gallup-survey/gallupindex.html.
216 Concern has been raised that "[a] policy that resorts to monetary
inducements, that replaces altruism by selfish self-interest and that manipulates
consent by monetary incentives, has too many ethical liabilities to be acceptable
either as a policy or as an experiment." Edmund D. Pellegrino, Families' SelfInterest and the Cadaver's Organs: What Price Consent?, in THE ETIcs OF ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS, supra note 13, at 206. This proposal recognizes these concerns and
attempts to allay them by focusing on both education and incentives.
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United States to increase its kidney supply.
6.1. Presumptivity
The first aspect of the proposal involves the concept of
presumptivity, which could certainly aid in increasing the number
of cadaveric kidney donations, but would also help the number of
living kidney donations by raising awareness. Presumed consent
for kidney procurement has been successful in some European
countries 217 and based on public opinion in the United States, it
appears that a majority of people are not averse to donating their
organs. Therefore, it would seem that presumed consent would
help increase the kidney supply; however, because the United
States is rooted in its commitment to the values of autonomy and
liberty, a strong or weak presumed consent system would conflict
with these core beliefs.
Presumptivity is a very weak form of presumed consent. The
system does not assume that a person will donate her kidney upon
her death; rather, it simply seeks to adjust our frame of mind when
considering whether to donate. For instance, volunteers for the
National Kidney Foundation, Red Cross, or similar organizations
could cold call people and discuss organ donation. Physicians and
insurance agents could also ask their patients and policyholders
about organ donation (as discussed in the second-prong of the
proposal). Instead of asking, "Would you like to donate your
kidney?" these groups of people should reframe the question to
something like, "You'd like to donate your kidney, as most people
wish to do, right?" In this way, we presume the potential donor
will donate and the onus is placed on the potential donor to opt
out of donating while she is still alive.
This subtle reframing of the question is similar to when a
physician needs a patient to come back to the office for more tests.
Typically, a doctor will say, "We need you to come back in a few
days to run some tests" rather than asking "Will you come back in
a few days so we can run some tests?" The doctor's office
presumes that patients will want to do what is in the best interest
of their health and, thus, will come back for the tests. If the patient
doesn't want to go back, or can't make it back on the day the office
wants her to come, then it is up to the patient to make those
intentions known.

217

Gallup poll, supra note 215.
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Presumptivity does not run into the same moral or legal
problems of autonomy that arise under a system of either strong or
weak presumed consent. People still maintain their autonomy
through opting out of donating, yet presumptivity retains some of
the characteristics of a presumed consent system that have proven
successful and capitalizes on people's lack of opposition to
donating.
6.2. Publicity and Education Campaign
The second aspect of my proposal involves a more aggressive
publicity campaign to help transform the way we conceptualize
kidney donation. Like presumptivity, this aspect could have an
impact on the number of cadaveric and living kidney donations in
this country.
The educational campaign's aim would be to heighten
awareness of the kidney shortage, present people with the ways
they can help, and alert them of the options available. Better
publicity and education seek to complement presumptivity by
providing people with knowledge; therefore, if someone wishes to
opt out of donating when someone asks them, they know they can.
But, more importantly, if people have a better understanding of the
shortage and dire need, there is a greater chance that people will
not opt out, or better yet, they will commit to a living donation.
Improved communication about living and cadaveric donation is
21 8
necessary to "increase public trust and awareness."
6.2.1.

Different sloganfor advertising

Currently, the advertisement campaign used for kidney
donation
involves billboards
or late-night/early-morning
television commercials echoing slogans such as "Be a Hero" or
"Make a Gift of Life." These slogans are meant to appeal to our
altruistic side; however, given the kidney shortage, they appear to
be somewhat ineffective.
The need for more mainstream
advertising and public awareness campaigns has not gone
unnoticed. Recently, the Bush Administration promulgated the
Organ Donation and Recovery Improvement Act,219 which
provided $15 million annually for fiscal year 2005 and as much as
218

Sheldon Zink et al., Living Donation: Focus on Public Concerns, 19 CLINICAL
581, 583 (2005).
Pub. L. No. 108-216, 118 Stat. 584 (2004) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2745-

TRANSPLANTATION
219

1 to -5).
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necessary for fiscal years 2006 to 2009 to increase public
awareness.220
To achieve the goals of this Act, the government should modify
its advertising campaign through the use of a different slogan.
Perhaps, instead of promoting altruism, campaigns could promote
a sense of duty in people through slogans such as "Do the Right
Thing: Donate a Kidney" or "Someone Out There Needs You:
Donate a Kidney." To be effective, however, the slogans must
reach many people, perhaps through urban billboards, television,
or radio. Flyers could be mailed out to households, and both
kidney donation organizations and the federal government could
take out newspaper or magazine advertisements. The government
publishes a brochure about Medicare to help educate people about
the program; it should be able to put together something similar
for kidney donation that could be placed in physicians' offices.
Perhaps television and broadcasting stations and newspaper and
magazine publishers could give the government these slots or ad
space for free, or for a slight tax break. The government, or the
FCC, could also consider requiring certain advertisers whose
products could affect kidney health, such as alcoholic beverage
companies, or drug manufacturers who have kidney-related drugs
in their pipeline, to sponsor five minutes of kidney advertisement
during primetime for every thirty minutes they spend on
advertising their own products. Additionally, stories of people
221
who altruistically donate should be highlighted by the media.
Another consideration for an improved advertisement
campaign would be to solicit celebrities who had kidney problems
and transplants to be spokespeople. 222 Celebrities are a good way
to heighten awareness because people feel as if they can identify

220 42 U.S.C. § 274f-1 (LexisNexis 2005); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§2730(a)-(b) (2003) (encouraging organ donation through state law); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 320.08047 (West 2005) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2108.15, 4506.081
(LexisNexis 2002) (same).
221 See, e.g., Ian Parker, The Gift: Zell Kravinsky Gave Away Millions But
Somehow It Wasn't Enough, NEW YORKER, Aug. 2, 2004, at 54, 54-63 (discussing Zell
Kravinsky, a wealthy man who donated a substantial amount of his money to
various organizations and decided to give someone his kidney because he
determined that organ donation was the ultimate gift).
222 See
All
American
Talent
and
Celebrity
Network,
http://www.allamericanspeakers.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (offering the
agency's services to help companies and organizations find celebrity
spokespeople).
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with a celebrity.223 Organizations and fundraisers see a definite
increase in donations and awareness when a celebrity is associated
with their cause.224 For instance, in February 2005, Alonzo
223 After her husband passed away from colon cancer, Katie Couric became a
very vocal spokeswoman to help educate the public. She not only appeared on
news shows, but hosted a special five-part series on Today, discussed her struggle
with losing a loved one in magazines, spoke before Congress, and even cofounded the National Colorectal Cancer Research Alliance, which has broad
celebrity support. See, e.g., Katie Couric, Katie Couric: I Must Share This Vital
Information (Mar. 31, 2004), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4602812/ (writing
about why it was important to her to be a co-anchor on a special five-part series
about colon cancer on the Today show); Joanna Powell, Katie Couric's Story: Life
After Loss, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING (Oct. 1998) at 124 (interviewing Katie Couric
about how she dealt with the loss of her husband to colon cancer and that she is
going to increase awareness); National Colorectal Cancer Research Alliance, at
http://www.eifoundation.org/national/nccra/splash/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2005)
(providing a variety of information about colon cancer, getting tested, donating,
and using celebrities to support the cause).
Rapper Nelly has associated himself with bone marrow drives because his
sister Jackie needed a bone marrow transplant when her leukemia relapsed in
January 2003. Nelly and his sister started the "Jes Us 4 Jackie" initiative to
educate black people about bone marrow and stem-cell transplants. Sadly,
Nelly's sister passed away in March 2005. See LAUNCH Radio Networks, Nelly's
Bone Marrow Donor Registration Drive Hits New York (July 25, 2003), at
http://music.yahoo.com/read/news/12048357 (announcing when Nelly would
be in New York City for his nationwide bone marrow donor drive); MTV, Nelly
Encourages Minorities to Become Bone Marrow Donors (June 23, 2003), at
(reporting
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1473175/06232003/nelly.jhtml
about the bone marrow drive, Nelly's role, and the drive's purpose); MTV, Nelly's
2005),
24,
(Mar.
Leukemia
with
Battle
Her
Loses
Sister
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1498948/20050324/story.jhtml
(announcing the sad news that Nelly's sister passed away); Jes Us 4 Jackie, at
http://www.jesus4jackie.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (providing information
about the foundation).
224 In 1996, for instance, Lance Armstrong was diagnosed with advanced
stage testicular cancer and the cancer spread to his brain and lungs. After surgery
to remove his right testicle, two brain legions, and chemotherapy, Armstrong
recovered and went on to win seven consecutive Tour de France titles. In 1997,
Armstrong founded the Lance Armstrong Foundation to raise money, and
support and inspire people with cancer to "live strong" through educational
programs, advocacy, and research programs. One fundraising initiative was a
yellow wristband with the words "Live Strong" on it. In conjunction with Nike,
the foundation began selling the wristbands in early summer 2004, with an initial
goal of raising $5 million. The wristbands sell in packets of 10, 100, and 1200, and
cost $1 for one wristband. As of May 2005, the foundation had sold over 50
million wristbands. In 2003, the foundation received $4,782,488 in cash or cashequivalent donations; in 2004, it received $19,843,725. The foundation's total
assets increased from $15,870,877 in 2003 to $44,441,804 in 2004. See generally
About Lance, at http://www.lancearmstrong.com (last visited Jan. 6, 2005)
(summarizing Lance Armstrong's life and career) Lance Armstrong Foundation,
2004 and 2003 Combined Audited Financial Statements (Feb. 14, 2005),
http://www.livestrong.org/atf/cf/{FB6FFD43-OE4C-4414-8B370DOO1EFBDC49}/
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Mourning 225 worked with American Greeting cards to come up
with a series of four inspirational cards, "Words of Strength," for
African Americans and Hispanics who are faced with kidney
disease. 226 The online greeting cards were offered free of charge
and sponsored by Ortho Biotech Products. 227 Mourning also
committed to visiting clinics throughout the United States to
228
discuss chronic kidney disease and its signs and symptoms.
Mourning's support and activities are a great step in the right
direction in terms of bringing kidney disease into the spotlight.
The federal and state governments, medical industry, and various
organizations should continue to encourage celebrity activism such
2003-2004CombinedAuditReport.pdf (providing financial information about the
Foundation and its fundraising); Lance Armstrong Foundation, About Us, at
http://www.livestrong.org/site/c.jvKZLbMRIsG/b.695471/k.D29D/AboutUs.
htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (stating the Foundation's goals and purposes);
Lance
Armstrong
Foundation,
Wristbands,
at
http://www.storelaf.org/wristbands.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2005) (providing the website to
purchase the "Live Strong" wristbands).
225 Alonzo Mourning is a famous professional basketball player who retired
in November 2003 because of his kidney disorder. About a month later, he had a
kidney transplant with a kidney from an unidentified family member. He has
since returned to professional basketball. See Sean Swint, Alonzo Mourning to Get
Kidney Transplant (Dec. 19, 2003), at http://www.webmd.com/content/
article/78/95902 (briefing readers about Alonzo Mourning's disease and his
health status); Miami Heat Player Profile, at http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/
players/profile?statsld=0845 (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (stating Mourning's status
and statistics).
226 Press Release, Ortho Biotech Products, Basketball Star Alonzo Mourning
Reaches Out to Fellow Kidney Disease Patients With a New Series of Online
Greeting Cards, (Feb. 9, 2005), http://www.orthobiotech.com/050209.html.
227 Id. In addition to sponsoring the cards, Ortho Biotech "pledged cash
donations to the National Kidney Foundation, the American Association of
Kidney Patients and the American Kidney Fund for each online greeting card
sent." The first online greeting card, which appeared in February 2005, coincided
with Black History Month and the remaining three were to coincide with Kidney
Disease Awareness Month (March), Women's Health month (May), and Hispanic
Health Month (June). February's card included a special recipe for jerk-rubbed
snapper that is designed specifically to meet the health needs of patients. Id.
228 Mourning's visits would include discussions about chronic kidney disease
in hopes of motivating people to see if they are at risk for the disease. Press
Release, Ortho Biotech Products, NBA Star Alonzo Mourning Spreads the Word
About Kidney Disease (Jun. 28, 2005), at http://www.orthobiotech.com/
050628.html. Mourning also lent support by attending an event on Capitol Hill in
July 2004 to "support new legislation aimed at helping hundreds of thousands of
Americans who suffer from kidney failure and who rely on Medicare for lifesaving dialysis treatments." Northwest Kidney Centers, Basketball Legend and
Kidney Disease Patient Alonzo Mourning Held Court on Capitol Hill (July 7, 2004), at
http://www.nwkidney.org/home/ alonzomourning.html (noting Mourning's
support for the legislation).
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as Mourning's. Living donation could be highlighted through
"donor days" where celebrities speak out about the need for living
donors and the altruistic nature of the act. 229 The kidney shortage
and steps people can take to help, both while living and after they
pass on, should also be highlighted in celebrity advertisementsposters, television ads, radio spots, magazine articles-and public
speeches to increase awareness.
An aggressive advertising campaign would heighten the
public's awareness of the kidney shortage and what they can do to
help. The more people know about the subject, the more open
discussion can occur, which could aid in increasing the kidney
supply.
6.2.2.

Education

The federal government should mandate that organ donation,
specifically kidney donation, be discussed in high school
classrooms. "Making good decisions about complicated issues
requires careful consideration." 230 Therefore, the health education
classes of schools should cover and facilitate discussion about
kidney donation; not only would the students gain more
awareness, but their education would facilitate discussions with
their family members and friends. 231 Schools teach teenagers
sexual education in health class; 23 2 there is no reason the health
classes could not teach students about the kidney shortage, kidney
donation, the different ethical considerations, and the necessity of
talking with their family about donating. The federal government
should consider enacting a statute that would provide high schools
with grant money to implement an organ donation program. Part
of the budget from the Organ Donation and Recovery
Improvement Act could be earmarked for this. This education

229 These donor days could be similar to blood drives or bone marrow drives
such as those Nelly promoted for Jes Us 4 Jackie. See supra note 222.
230 Spital, supra note 31, at 149.
231 See id. (explaining that education about organ donation is preferable to
"the question of organ donation [being] sprung upon people at motor vehicle
bureaus" because "[tihis issue should be considered in a setting that provides
ample opportunity for reflection and discussion with family and friends, and
these deliberations should take place before a decision is made").
232 Sexual education programs, however, are not mandated by the federal
government. See Issues and Answers: Fact Sheet on Sexuality Education,SIECUS at 4,
available at http://www.siecus.org/pubs/fact/FSissues-answers.pdf (last visited
Feb. 18, 2006).
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should be considered particularly important and necessary since it
seems that young people are too often the ones who tragically find
themselves in life-threatening situations while their next of kin
23 3
often are unaware of their wishes.
A potential roadblock for this education program could be
other interest groups who want access or the same class time for
their causes.
For instance, interest groups representing
organizations concerning heart disease might clamor for equal time
in the classroom. While these diseases and the issues they raise are
important and people should be aware of them, there is a pressing
need for kidney donation education because broad public
participation is the only way to solve the dire shortage of kidneys.
Discussion about kidney disease and transplantation could also be
covered during class lessons about diets and eating habits since
heart disease is contributes to kidney failure. The government
could reassess the effectiveness of the organ education programs
and grants after a set period of time and if the results are positive,
or the goals are met, then the program could continue since schools
have new students each year; if the program results are negative,
however, then the program could be scaled back.
Additionally, high school health education classes could talk
about the need for young people to have living wills or advanced
234
directives since it is the "young people who die unexpectedly."
Health education classes could encourage the students to consider
executing these living wills or advanced directives and as part of
those documents, they could state their preference for kidney
233 Trauma from car accidents is one of the leading causes of death for young
adults, and they constitute a higher percentage of organ donors. See e.g., Ellen
Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United States,
349 NEw ENG. J. MED. 667, 670 (2003) (stating that of the study participants,
approximately nineteen percent of their cadaveric donors were eighteen or
younger while only seven percent were above the age of sixty-five, and that about
forty-four percent of the donors died from trauma). In 2005, of the 5,714 cadaveric
donors, 1,869 were between the ages of eleven to thirty-four and 1,525 between
ages thirty-five to forty-nine. There were 1,151 donors who died from a motor
vehicle accident in 2005, which accounted for about one-third of the donors. Head
trauma was the cause of death in 2,212 donors, which accounted for about half of
the donors. See also The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network,
Deceased Donors Recovered in the U.S. by Circumstance of Death (Dec. 30, 2005),
http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp (reporting the number of deceased
donors by circumstance of death); The Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network, Deceased Donors Recovered in the U.S. by Cause of Death (Dec. 30, 2005),
http://www.optn.org/latestData/rptData.asp (reporting the number of deceased
donors by cause of death).
2m Spital, supra note 31.
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donation. Further, lawyers, when discussing these documents, or
even when counseling clients on estate planning, should include
235
kidney donation as part of the conversation.
The medical community could also participate in the education
process by speaking to the public about the donation process.
Hospitals could make public information regarding the general
health outcomes of donor and recipients such as the percentage of
successful versus unsuccessful transplants or the percentage of
patients who suffered from adverse side effects and which ones,
encouraging donors to speak to the media about their story, help
clarify any confusion regarding medical reimbursement for
cadaveric versus living donation, or ask physicians and transplant
teams speak to the media to facilitate more openness and
236
transparency to the process.
Physicians could also have more open discussions about
laparoscopic surgery, so individuals who are not aware of it would
understand the benefits such as reduced recovery time, which
would mean less burden financially, socially, and mentally for a
living kidney donor. 237 The medical profession is in a unique
position because they possess the medical knowledge regarding
kidney transplants, have a solid understanding of the kidney
shortage, and interact with the patients. Physicians, therefore,
could exert some pressure on politicians to include not only
themselves in the policy process or public forums such as hearings
about kidney procurement, but also donors and recipients of both
living and cadaveric transplants. Ultimately, the donors and
recipients are the ones who understand best what a patient goes
government to
through.238 Physicians could also pressure the
239
increase funding for research and data collection.
Lastly, the failure to obtain permission from potential donors
235 See Rudy Serra & Annette E. Skinner, Feature: Counseling the Gay, Lesbian,
Bisexual, or Transgender Client, 80 MICH. B.J. 52, 54 (2001) (suggesting that it is
important for a client to provide a power of attorney for health care decisions,
which is a "logical document to use to authorize organ and tissue donation and
the ability to make burial decisions").
236 See Zink supra note 218, at 584 (suggesting ways the medical community
could use the media to inform the public about organ donation).
237 See Stephen T. Bartlett, Laparoscopic Living Donor Nephrectomy for Kidney
Transplantation,28 DIALYSIS & TRANSPLANTATION 318, 331 (1999) (detailing some of
the benefits of laparoscopic surgery such as shorter hospital stays and less
scarring).
238 Id.
239 Id.
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or their families also contributes to the lack of donors. 240 Several
studies have shown that a significant number of health care
professionals do not know their own health care institution's braindeath and organ donation policies or what the institution's medical
criteria is for those situations. 241 Therefore, the medical institutions
should also establish in-house education programs for their own
medical professionals and staff in order to ensure that everyone
knows and understands what the hospital's transplant policies are,
thereby enabling the institutions' professionals and staff to better
serve their patients and the transplant process.
Better education would complement an aggressive advertising
campaign by improving public awareness about the kidney
shortage and available treatment options. Again, the more people
know about the situation and what they can do to help, the more
informed they will be in making an autonomous decision.
6.2.3.

Other avenues to sign up donors

Our system for kidney donation currently relies heavily on the
driver's licensing system to get people to sign up to donate kidneys
by soliciting an agreement about willingness to donate on licensing
applications. The shortage of kidneys suggest that this system has
not been especially successful, perhaps because it depends on a
state employee and a licensing clerk to ask an individual about
whether she would like to donate. And, even if the employee does
ask, it is uncertain whether the employee would be able to
appropriately answer questions concerning kidney transplants and
the procurement process.
Therefore, the federal government must consider other avenues
to reach people about kidney donation. One possible solution is
blood drives. It seems likely that people who donate blood would
also be inclined to donate kidneys because of their altruistic nature,
and for those people who have not affirmatively made a decision
to donate, a blood drive would be a great and convenient
opportunity. The federal government should ask the organizations
sponsoring the blood drives, such as the Red Cross, to advertise
240 See Futterman, supra note 202, at 164 (arguing that the disparity between
supply and demand of organs could be considered a result of failure to get
permission to procure the organs from potential donors).
241 See id. at 164 (citing several studies that demonstrate that a significant
number of healthcare professionals lack the relevant knowledge concerning their
institution's brain-death and organ donation policies).
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that people can also sign up for kidney donation at the same time
the organizations promote their blood drives.
Churches and other houses of worship would also serve as
good institutions to educate people about the kidney shortage and
need for kidneys. Houses of worship could be particularly
important in encouraging living organ donation since several
major world religions favor kidney donation in order to help
another human being. 242 The message of altruism would be
especially effective. Churches could also play a crucial role in
increasing the number of African American donors. African
Americans suffer from kidney failure more than people of other
races. 243 They also spend a longer time on the waiting list for a
kidney 244 because there is a shortage of kidneys from African
Americans 245 and they have lower rates of cadaveric donation
246
compared to other races.
242 See Caplan & Veatch, supra note 157 (discussing the permissibility of organ
donation in the eyes of those religions when it is to help another human being);
Veatch, supra note 158, at 9 (discussing religious traditions related to the handling
of the body and their implications relevant to organ procurement).
243 In 2003, about 900 out of 1,000,000 African Americans, aged fifty to fiftynine, had end stage renal disease compared to 200 out of 1,000,000 Caucasians of
the same age cohort. For African Americans, aged 30 to 39, nearly 100 out of
1,000,000 had end stage renal disease compared to about 30 out of 1,000,000
Caucasians of the same age range. United States Renal Data System, Incidence and
Prevalence of ESRD (2005), available at http://www.usrds.org/atlas.htm. Two of
the leading causes for kidney failure include diabetes and high blood pressure,
which occur in higher rates of African Americans than Caucasians. See, e.g., Lynt
B. Johnson, Some of the Challenges of Encouraging Organ Donation Among Minority
Populations, 65 N.C. MED. J. 35, 35 (Jan./Feb. 2004) (claiming that hypertension
occurs at a rate of thirty percent versus twenty percent in other populations and
that African Americans with diabetes are three times more likely at risk for end
stage renal disease).
244 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 243, at 36 (noting that in 1997, African
Americans waited, on average, two and a half years longer for a kidney than
Caucasians).
245 African Americans need kidneys from other African Americans because of
tissue matching. See Northwest Kidney Centers, African Americans and the Need for
Organ Donation, http://www.nwkidney.org/yourhealth/organdonor/african
_need.html (listing some facts about why African Americans are in need of
kidneys). See also Johnson, supra note 243, at 36 (stating that in a study of the state
of Maryland, sixty-five percent of Caucasians self-identified as organ donors on
their driver's licenses while only nineteen percent of African American men did
so, and while sixty percent of Caucasian families would permit a cadaveric
donation of a loved one, only twenty-five percent of African American families
would).
246 This distrust could stem from several reasons, but centers around a
general distrust of the medical establishment and fear that if an African American
decides to be a cadaveric donor, the physicians will not do everything to help her
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Therefore, increased education and communication about the
shortage and need for kidneys in a community environment like a
church, or at an event that already involves altruistically inclined
people such as a blood drive, might help improve rates of
cadaveric and living kidney donation.
6.2.4.

Centralized database

Currently, there is no effective database that lists willing
kidney donors.
NOTA created the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network ("OPTN"), a non-profit, federally funded
organization, to systemize organ donation and devise standards
for the process. 247 OPTN then contracted with the United Network
for Organ Sharing ("UNOS"), "a non-profit, scientific and
educational organization that administers the nation's only
[OPTN] .248

While UNOS provides comprehensive data on the number of
donors needed per organ, the number of living donors, and the
number of deceased donors, it does not track those who are willing
to donate. 249 Therefore, the federal government should consider
creating a centralized database, a national donor registry, so that
hospitals can easily determine whether there is a match for a
kidney transplant. 250
Kidney donor information should be
collected routinely, just as a person's social security number is.
recover and that the organ will not go to another African American. See William
A. Wolfe, Increasing African American Kidney Donors: The Feasibility and Potential
Role of Nephrology Nurses and Social Workers, 37 Soc. WORK IN HEALTH CARE 4, 73
(2003) (discussing potential reasons why African Americans have low rates of
donation).
247 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 274(b)(2)(A)(i)-(ii) (LEXIS, 2005) (listing the functions of
the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network ("OPTN")). OPTN was
supposed to have a dual computer system, one that listed people who needed
kidneys and one that listed those who were willing to donate.
248 The United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS") was awarded the initial
OPTN contract in 1986 and has had the contract since. Through OPTN,UNOS
collects and manages the transplant data, facilitates the organ matching and
placement process, and helps develop organ transplantation policy. See United
Network for Organ Sharing, Who We Are, http://www.unos.org/whoWeAre/
(last visited Feb 18, 2006) (describing the purpose and role of UNOS).
249 See
generally, United
Network
for
Organ
Sharing,
Data,
http://www.unos.org/data/about/viewDataReports.asp (last visited Feb 18,
2006) (providing a variety of data reports concerning organ need and organ
donors).
250 See World Med. Ass'n, supra note 37 (noting that doctors are in a prime
position to help increase organ donation and that a national registry linking
together patients and willing donors would be an effective solution).
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For instance, when people go to visit any type of physician,
they are normally required to fill out paperwork. The federal
government could encourage physicians, if not mandate them, to
have a section within that patient information questionnaire that
relates to kidney donation: whether the patient has ever consulted
with a doctor about the process, whether the patient is a donor,
whether the patient would like to be a cadaveric donor, whether
the patient would consider being a living donor. It seems unlikely
that there would be any reason a patient would feel forced to
answer "yes" to any of those questions. The questions do not ask
the patient to commit to any course of action; they simply are a
means of gathering information about the patient. If the patient
had any questions relating to it, she could ask the physician during
her appointment, and after each patient appointment, the
physician would enter in the information into the national
registry.

251

Physicians may argue that because of the demands placed on
them by insurance companies, they do not have time to have a
conversation with each and every patient they see. Thus, perhaps
there should be some financial incentive for these doctors to talk
with their patients. This incentive could come from the money
health insurance companies save on patients who either have
laparoscopic surgery or transplants, which cost less overall than a
patient on life-long dialysis. 252 Physicians could attach these claims
along with the patient's other insurance claims.
Another way to get kidney donation information from people
would be through health or life insurance companies. When
people sign up for their policies, the insurance form could have a
251 Further research should be conducted as to how the national registry and
the doctors' involvement would conform to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), which addresses the security and privacy of
patient health data. See United States Department of Health and Human Services,
Office for Civil Rights - HIPAA, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/ (last visited
Feb 18, 2006) (providing basic and comprehensive information about HIPAA and
compliance).
252 See Alexander Tabarrok, Life-Saving Incentives: Consequences, Costs and
Solutions to the Organ Shortage, THE LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY (Apr. 5,

2004),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2004/Tabarrokorgans.html
(last visited Feb 23, 2006) ("Kidney transplants are cheaper than dialysis over
prospective lifetimes and they pay for themselves within two to three years.").
Additionally, most dialysis costs are covered by the government through the End
Stage Renal Disease Program. Thus, money saved from this program could be
used to provide some financial incentive to doctors to talk to their patients. Id.
(summarizing how transplants cost less money in the long-run than dialysis).
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section requiring that information and the insurance representative
could be on hand to answer any questions of the policyholders.
The insurance agent could then enter the data into the centralized
database. If the potential policyholder had general questions about
the donation process, the insurance agent could answer them and
if the agent was unsure of the correct answer, the agent could
direct the potential policyholder to the right source of information.
For those who do not have easy or affordable access to doctors, or
cannot afford insurance policies, social workers could bear the
responsibility of talking about the kidney shortage and need for
organs when meeting with people about welfare, jobs, housing, or
any other similar issue.
An accessible, centralized system that contains donor
information could make kidney procurement more effective. As
long as the information is entered into the system, a centralized
database could easily bring together recipients and donors.
6.2.5.

Amend NOTA

In order to better regulate United States citizens from
participating in the illegal kidney trade, the federal government
should amend NOTA to ban physicians from treating those
patients who illegally purchased a kidney and had it transplanted
abroad. Currently, the Act only bans the interstate sale of kidneys,
which includes foreign commerce, 253 and does not place any
sanction on physicians who know their patients have illegally
obtained a kidney abroad; physicians are only prohibited from
participating in the transfer of a kidney and not from any medical
treatment after the kidney has been transplanted.
Additionally, the government should create a reporting system,
perhaps as part of the centralized database for donors, which only
the proper authorities would have access. Physicians could report
patients whom they suspected obtained an illegal kidney and the
proper authorities could conduct further investigation. Stricter
regulations and sanctions would help limit illegal kidney
transactions. The laws would deter people from participating in
illegal kidney sales and transplants abroad because of fear their
physicians may turn them in to the authorities when they seek
medical care post-transplant.

253

See supra note 108.
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6.3. Weak Economic Incentivization
The third aspect of my proposal focuses mainly on increasing
the number of people who commit to donating their organs upon
their death by offering some sort of a weak economic incentive,
although there are a couple proposals that aim to increase living
donations. Weak economic incentives would also help increase
kidney donation "in populations now giving the fewest organs,
needing them the most, and being underserved by the present
donation system" such as African Americans. 254
Although some may argue that even a weak economic
incentivization takes away from the altruistic nature of donating,
while it is noble for the United States to employ a kidney
procurement system based on altruism, this social notion of
regarding the interests of others comes from the perspective of
people (such as politicians, medical professionals, or bioethicists)
who have the luxury of generally being "able to manage
circumstances to the benefit of ourselves and others." 255 Our
altruistic system removes any idea that kidneys could be procured
by motivating people to donate through any other type of
incentive. 256 "We who have advocated 'free choice' in altruistic
organ donation have fully ignored the fact that we are imposing
our own values on persons who may not appreciate those values at
all." 257 Therefore, it is important to consider the best way to
increase the kidney supply with as few ethical violations as
possible. Weak economic incentives could be the "push" a
potential donor, who would consider donating altruistically,
needed to make her ultimate decision to donate.
The concept of weak economic incentives is not new; however,
this proposal seeks to combine four types in an attempt to
effectively increase the kidney supply. In a recent study, a
majority of respondents favored the idea of providing donors
benefits for organ donation, but the findings suggested that direct
payment would receive the least amount of support. 258 Therefore,
Id.
Id. at 199.
256 See generally id. (discussing why offering death benefits could help
increase the organ supply).
257 Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The Issue of Payment in Cadaveric Organ
Donation, 264 J. AM. MED. ASS'N, Mar. 13, 1991, at 1302, 1303.
258 See C.L. Bryce et al., Do Incentives Matter? Providing Benefits to Families of
Organ Donors, 5 AM. J. OF TRANSPLANTATION 2999, 3005 (2005) (concluding that,
generally, people would welcome a policy such as benefits or incentives that
254

255
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this proposal offers a combination of four weak economic
incentives as an alternative to direct payment.
6.3.1.

Tax deductions and limited reimbursementfor medical
expenses

A tax break could be offered to an individual, or the
individual's family, if she decides to be a living kidney donor.
Such laws have already been passed in states like Wisconsin 259 and
Georgia, 260 which provide $10,000 in tax deductions for costs
associated with living donor donation such as travel expenses, lost
wages, and hotel bills. Maryland has proposed and Arkansas
offers living donors a tax deduction for themselves or their
dependents. 261 On the surface, these laws seem to provide
incentives for people to do a living donation, which might exploit
the poor; however, the laws are more like "reimbursements rather
than incentives" 262 because the living donor is refunded the money
she spent in traveling expenses or lost wages. Therefore, the
person is only incentivized to be a living donor because she will
not lose any money; she is not incentivized by the prospect of
making money on her donation.
Additionally, if a person decides to be a cadaveric donor, the
would help increase organ donation).
259 Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.05(10)(i) (2005) (effective Jan. 30, 2004).
260 Ga. Code Ann. § 48.7.27(13) (2005)
261 See Income Tax-Subtraction Modification for Living Organ Donors, MD
General Assembly, H.R. 443 (Md. 2005) (proposing a subtraction modification for
specified expenses that are attributable to organ donation to another individual
under specified circumstances. The maximum tax deduction is $10,000 and only
applies to one organ donation); Gift of Life, H.R. 1393, 85th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2005) (finding that organ donating that "organ donation is courageous,
admirable, and vital demonstration of one's commitment to the value of human
life and, in many instances, is necessary for the preservation of life itself" and
offering tax deductions on net income for expenses related to living organ
donation such as travel, medical, lodging, and lost wages). See also Wesley Brown,
House Committee Endorses Tax Deduction for Organ Donors, ARKANSAS NEWS
BUREAU, Feb. 9, 2005, http://www.arkansasnews.com/archive/2005/02/09/
News/317001.html (reporting on the passage of the bill and summarizing its
effects). As of winter 2005, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Utah all had similar legislation pending. See Hannah Vahaba,
A New Georgia Law Compensates Living Organ Donors, Transplant Chronicles
(Winter
2005),
available
at
http://www.kidney.org/transplantation/
livingDonors/shareShowStory.cfm?storylD=92 (noting which states passed tax
deductions for living organ donation and which states had pending legislation).
262 Bryce, supra note 258, at 3007.
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federal government could consider providing an estate tax credit
for the deceased donor's family. Because only a small number of
deaths qualify for kidney donation, it would not cost much for the
federal government to provide such a credit. While this weak
economic incentive is admittedly unfair because it would not
provide the incentive to the poor, it may increase the number of
rich people who donate, which would increase the overall number
of kidneys. A rich person may not be motivated by a tax
reimbursement; they already have the economic means and the
opportunity to be a living donor if they want to be. An estate tax,
however, could be appealing because it would provide a financial
break to the rich donor's loved ones upon her death.
Lastly, the federal or state governments could provide limited
reimbursement for the medical expenses associated with persistent
vegetative state (PVS) care for someone donating a kidney upon
her death because PVS care could be an expensive burden on the
Currently, doctors, hospitals, and organ
patient's family.
transplant services are the ones who benefit the most, financially,
from a transplant procedure. In 1992, a review of twenty-three
patients in PVS found that the hospital bills of the patients, on
Limited reimbursement for those
average, were $170,000.263
families whose loved ones decided to donate could alleviate some
of the tremendous medical expense associated with end-of-life
care. A weak economic incentive like limited medical care
reimbursement would ease concerns that a family might "hasten"
the death of a loved one for financial reasons. Direct payment
could motivate families to end a loved one's life earlier than
necessary, essentially profiting from the direct payment. Limited
a
merely
provides
reimbursement,
however,
medical
reimbursement to help minimize the cost of the deceased's medical
treatment and does not create a situation where a family could be
left financially better off than they were before the deceased passed
away.
A tax credit or limited reimbursement of medical expenses
would provide compensation for donation unlike an open market,
which places a direct price tag on the kidney. These weak financial
incentives could be the catalyst for a potential donor yet minimize
the exploitation of the poor because the incentive is not as coercive
263 See generally David Myland Kaufman & Richard B. Lipton, The Persistent
Vegetative State: An Analysis of Clinical Correlates and Costs, 92 N.Y. STATE J. MED.
381 (1992) (summarizing the overall costs of PVS care).
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as a direct payment.
6.3.2.

Reimbursement offuneral expenses

Reimbursement for the donor's funeral expenses could be
offered as an in-kind reward. Pennsylvania offered such a death
benefit program; it established a pilot program that contributed
$300 toward the funeral expenses of each organ donor. 264 The
compensation was paid directly to the funeral home or hospital,
and not the donor's family or estate. 265 The pilot program,
however, was short-lived because of concern that it violated
federal law. 266 Such a program would require documentation of
the funeral to avoid situations where a family does not have a
funeral for the deceased donor in order to pocket the
reimbursement.
Similar to the other weak financial incentives, just because
payment is offered, the altruistic nature of the organ donation does
not disappear. This type of incentive system is analogous to a
church patron giving money to the church or a person donating
money to a charity or school. 267 People are motivated to do such
actions not only because they are altruistic, but also for the reduced
taxes 268 or other financial benefit such as a reimbursement of
funeral expenses.
Specifically, this weak financial incentive would require
simultaneous education and communication with the African
American community concerning kidney donation because of
Offering reimbursement for
cultural and historical reasons.
funeral expenses could stir up memories of the last time the
government offered African Americans funeral expenses, which
was "when the bodies of those who died in the notorious Tuskegee
Syphilis study were sought for autopsy." 269 Thus, in order to show
264 1994 Pa. Legis. Serv. 102 (West 1994); see also Siegel, supra note 43, at 941
(detailing how Pennsylvania subsequently limited payments for funeral expenses

to $300).
265 Siegel, supra note 43, at 941 (detailing how Pennsylvania's Organ
Donation Awareness Trust Fund works).
266 See generally Hope Yen, State to Give $300 to Organ Donors, PITr. POSTGAZETTE (Mar. 30, 2000) at B6 (reporting on the Pennsylvania pilot program and
the reason it was halted).
267 See Barnett supra note 13, at 211 (providing an analogous example to show
why financial incentives for organ donation should be permissible).

268

Id.

269

Caplan et al., supra note 157, at 221.
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sensitivity to these past experiences, the government and medical
profession would need to be open with the African American
community about kidney procurement, the shortage of organs, and
how this incentive aids in increasing the kidney supply and will
not harm the African American community.
Similar to the tax credits and limited medical reimbursement, a
reimbursement for funeral expenses would not be a direct payment
for the kidney; rather, it would provide the donor's family with
some financial relief for donating.
6.3.3.

Life or health insurancepremium discount

This proposal incorporates Hansmann's suggestion to use a
discount on a life or health insurance policy to encourage
policyholders to be cadaveric kidney donors as one of the four
weak economic incentives the government should utilize to
increase the kidney supply. The federal government could
mandate that states determine a certain monetary discount for
insurance premiums. Individuals would have the ability to change
their mind each time their insurance premium is renewed;
therefore, they maintain their autonomy because they are not
locked into their decision. For example, if a twenty-two year-old
man starts working for a corporation whose life insurance
company offers a deduction for donating his kidney, he may opt to
donate his kidney upon his death. Every year he is asked to renew
his policy, including the provision specifying his willingness to
donate. Five years later, he marries a woman who does not want
him to donate a kidney for whatever reason. When his policy is up
for renewal, he then may choose the option to not donate his
kidney upon his death.
While people may be uncomfortable with a government statute
that allows this, people should realize that although the
government respects the right of individuals to choose what to do
with their bodies, there are certain situations where state interests
call for government intervention. For instance, while a woman
may choose to become a prostitute, the government has
270
determined, for public policy reasons, that prostitution is illegal.
A dire kidney shortage, such as the one occurring today, could
very well be a legitimate state interest justifying the government's
intervention in enacting proposals to increase the kidney supply.
270

See Gray, supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, as discussed previously, people with either
health or life insurance could talk to representatives about their
options. By discussing general issues with representatives and
following up on the representatives' suggestions about where to
seek additional information, the individuals will be more wellinformed of their options for donating. For those who do not
consent and leave the decision to a family member, the insurance
company could require that the donor's family member be present
during any conversation regarding the donor's decision to be a
cadaveric donor before approving the premium discount. Thus,
the family member will be informed of kidney donation during a
calmer time so she can absorb the information rather than being
put on the spot after her relative has passed away.
Alone, this proposal would not be effective because it would
not generate the kidney supply needed to meet the demand
because the deceased donors must be brain dead. However,
because this aspect of the proposal does not run into as many
ethical concerns as an open market, it could be combined with
other suggestions to effectively increase the kidney supply through
cadaveric and living donations.
7.

CONCLUSION

The kidney shortage requires swift action. Countries around
the world have recognized both the shortage and the existence of
the black market. If countries seek to eliminate the black market,
they need to truly enforce the laws they already have established
against the sale of kidneys. Additionally, they need to take other
proactive measures to increase the supply of kidneys from
cadavers, which would lessen the need of kidneys from live
people. Because most people are not morally opposed to donating
their kidneys, it is important to inform them about how to donate
and offer incentives to motivate them to take the steps necessary to
ensure donation.
Commodification of kidneys through a direct payment is
ethically impermissible. An open market in which donors can
presently sell their kidneys or one that allows their relatives to sell
their kidney rights is unacceptable. First, the underprivileged will
still be taken advantage of and have less access to the kidneys.
Second, allowing family members to contract to sell relatives'
kidneys strips the donor of his autonomy. Lastly, a slippery slope
would emerge over what could be commodified next.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss1/5
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The futures market offers an alternative similar to the open
market, except that the right to the kidney is purchased for the
future. While it is unethical to promote absolute contracts for the
sale of one's kidney, it is acceptable to provide people with the
option to sell the future right to her kidney on a renewable basis.
In this way, individuals do not lose their autonomy because they
can change their decision at set periods of time. Individuals will be
informed of their donating options and while their donation might
not reflect pure altruism, individuals are still choosing to help
others.
Presumed consent for kidneys, while successful abroad, is not
an ideal proposal either. Presumed consent creates confusion, as
well as loss of individual autonomy. If an individual does not
remember to express her objection, she loses her right once she
passes away. Additionally, if she does not object, confusion might
arise if family members try to decide what the individual might
have wanted. Either way, the deceased has lost her right to choose
what to do with her kidneys.
No one proposal is without downsides, but the hybrid proposal
of presumptivity, a more aggressive publicity and education
campaign, and the use of weak incentives would maximize the
271
benefits of the proposals and minimize the consequences.
Presumptivity will aid in raising the number of cadaveric
donations without stripping people of their autonomy. Through a
more aggressive publicity and education campaign, individuals
will become more aware of the kidney shortage, which would help
Additionally, in order to have an organ procurement system that is
effective, we cannot simply focus on creating such a system, but must address the
participants, particularly the donors, because "donor safety is paramount." Zink,
supra note 218, at 583. Donor safety can be protected through informed consent,
which is absolutely essential to organ donation, living or cadaveric, and a
standardized form of informed consent should be established to ensure an ethical
practice of organ donation. Some additional suggestions to consider would be
providing the donor with an advocate who will protect the donor's best interests,
protecting donors from extraneous costs for donation such as child care or lost
wages, and implementing a long-term follow-up of the donor that includes both
mental and physical evaluations. See generally id. (concluding that donor safety is
important, and that studies should formulate a standardized plan for obtaining
the informed consent of donors in order to protect donor interests in the longterm). Further, research should be conducted to help address the psychological
Psychological screening and
issues that donors and recipients may face.
evaluation should be mandatory, criteria for identifying psychologically
inappropriate donors and for evaluating participants' psychological state of mind
should be established, and methods to track donor's post-transplant mental
quality of health should be developed. Id.
271
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increase the number of cadaveric and living donations.
Additionally, a national donor registry would create the necessary
link between those who need donors and those who are willing to
supply them. Lastly, weak financial incentives or in-kind rewards
will assist in increasing the number of cadaveric and living donors
because they can commit an altruistic act of donation at no
financial cost to themselves.
In conclusion, no solution is going to be perfect. But, as a
society, we are facing a dire situation and need to take action to
remedy the shortage to help save lives. Thus, this ethically
acceptable solution offers the United States an optimal solution to
maximize the kidney supply. Once the kidney supply levels reach
a more desirable level, the system can be reevaluated.
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